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THE LIMITS OF COPYRIGHT OFFICE EXPERTISE
Aaron Perzanowski†

ABSTRACT
The mismatch between the expanding administrative and regulatory obligations of the
United States Copyright Office and its limited institutional expertise is an emerging problem
for the copyright system. The Office’s chief responsibility—registration and recordation of
copyright claims—has taken a back seat in recent years to a more ambitious set of substantive
rulemakings and policy recommendations. As the triennial rulemaking under the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act highlights, the Office is frequently called upon to answer
technological questions far beyond its plausible claims of subject matter expertise. This Article
traces the Office’s history, identifies its substantial but discrete areas of expertise, and reveals
the ways in which the Office has overstepped any reasonable definition of its expert
knowledge. This Article concludes with a set of recommendations to better align the Office’s
agenda with its expertise by, first, reducing the current regulatory burdens on the Office, and
second, building greater technological and economic competence within the Office, better
equipping it to address contemporary questions of copyright policy.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Designed to serve the crucial yet prosaic function of registering copyright
claims, the United States Copyright Office (“Office”) increasingly asserts wideranging authority to interpret copyright law, advise courts and federal agencies,
promulgate administrative and substantive rules, and broadly shape copyright
policy.1 Recent years have witnessed a flurry of Office rulemaking and policy
studies addressing issues from bulk registration2 and the location of copyright


1. See Letter from Karyn Temple Claggett, Acting Register of Copyrights, to David
Levi, President, Am. Law Institute (Jan. 16, 2018), https://drive.google.com/file/d/
1gAYHgxkUqre7LdRpIu4cEdBDJ3thdfpu/view [https://perma.cc/W9KN-PU32].
2. See Group Registration of Newspapers, 83 Fed. Reg. 4,144 (Jan. 30, 2018) (codified
at 37 C.F.R. pts. 201, 202); Group Registration of Photographs, 83 Fed. Reg. 2,542 (Jan. 18,
2018) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pts. 201, 202).
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notices 3 to resale royalties 4 and orphan works. 5 More controversially, the
Office is in the midst of its seventh triennial rulemaking under § 1201 of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)6 and has waded into, among other
topics, copyright’s application to software-enabled consumer devices like cars,
kitchen appliances, and medical devices. 7 Should security researchers be
required to disclose the flaws they uncover to device makers and developers
before going public? Should farmers be able to repair their tractors over the
objections of manufacturers? These are the sorts of bizarrely incongruous
questions that the Office confronts today.
At the same time, the Office faces nagging constitutional questions about
the scope of its authority and an often contentious relationship with the
Library of Congress, of which it remains a subordinate office. Motivated in
part by these concerns, some have called for greater independence for the
Office. These proposals are closely linked to ongoing efforts to concentrate
additional authority within the Office. To take a recent example, the Copyright
Alternative in Small-Claims Enforcement (CASE) Act would establish a small
claims tribunal within the Office that has the power to adjudicate infringement
disputes.8
As the federal body responsible for administering copyright law, the Office
offers considerable expertise on questions at the core of its competence.
However, as a result of both Congressional mandates and the Office’s own
ambitions, mission creep poses a problem. The Office regularly tackles
complex economic and technological questions that extend well beyond both
its historical mission and its most credible claims of subject matter expertise.
Mission creep is a cause for concern for at least two reasons. First, through
both the input it provides to Congress and its own direct regulatory action, the
Office may advocate or adopt flawed policies. Second, the Office’s growing

3. See Affixation and Position of Copyright Notice, 82 Fed. Reg. 42,735 (Sept. 12, 2017)
(codified at 37 C.F.R. pts. 201, 202).
4. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, RESALE ROYALTIES: AN UPDATED ANALYSIS (2013).
5. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS DIGITIZATION (2015).
6. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (providing for a rulemaking conducted by the Librarian
of Congress, acting on the recommendation of the Register of Copyrights, to determine
whether “users of a copyrighted work are, or are likely to be in the succeeding 3-year period,
adversely affected by [§ 1201(a)(1)(A)] in their ability to make noninfringing uses under this
title of a particular class of copyrighted works”).
7. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SOFTWARE-ENABLED CONSUMER PRODUCTS (2016)
[hereinafter CONSUMER PRODUCTS REPORT].
8. See H.R. 5757, 114th Cong. (2d Sess. 2016), H.R. 3945, 115th Cong. (1st Sess. 2017).
See generally Ben Depoorter, If You Build It, They Will Come: The Promises and Pitfalls of a Copyright
Small Claims Process, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 711 (2018); Pamela Samuelson & Kathryn
Hashimoto, Scholarly Concerns About a Proposed Small Copyright Claims Tribunal, 33 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 689 (2018).
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docket distracts it from its core task of developing and maintaining a
registration system that serves the needs of copyright holders and the public.
In some ways, the strains facing the Office are an unavoidable byproduct
of an environment that is profoundly shaped by technological change and the
expanding scope and significance of copyright law. Software copyright,
technological protection measures, and digital distribution have altered the
copyright landscape in dramatic ways.9 Copyright law now regulates the use of
software, both directly and indirectly, that is embedded in an astounding range
of every day devices, even in the absence of traditional copyright
infringement.10 The need for experts to inform copyright policy in light of
these developments is evident. Copyright law today implicates matters of
security, privacy, and industrial competition that were entirely foreign to
copyright policy debates just a few decades ago. But delegations and assertions
of authority are insufficient to establish genuine expertise. If the Office intends
to lead the policy conversation moving forward, it needs to build competence
in those areas in which it is currently lacking. That process should begin with
a frank assessment of the questions the Office is well-positioned to answer and
those it is not.
This Article, while far from comprehensive, contributes to that
conversation. Part II situates the Office, both historically and constitutionally,
and considers recent proposals to alter its structure. Part III considers the role
of expertise in justifying agency authority generally before turning to the core
competencies of the Office. Part IV identifies the limits of the Office’s
expertise and focuses on perhaps the clearest example of the Office operating
beyond its expertise, the triennial DMCA rulemaking. Part V considers how
the Office might build the expertise necessary for a twenty-first century
copyright agency.
II.

THE COPYRIGHT OFFICE

The Office owes its origin to the system of formalities—now largely
vestigial—that defined U.S. copyright law for centuries. The Copyright Act of
1790 required works to be registered with federal district courts and copies to
be deposited with the Secretary of State.11 The 1870 overhaul of the Copyright

9. More broadly, copyright law is not alone in facing new regulatory challenges in the
face of ubiquitous software. See Paul Ohm & Blake Reid, Regulating Software When Everything
Has Software, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1672, 1673 (2016) (describing this trend as “the inevitable
result of embedding software in everything”).
10. But see Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (holding that a claim for circumvention requires a “critical nexus” to copyright
infringement).
11. Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124 §§ 3, 4.
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Act, championed by Librarian of Congress’s Ainsworth Spofford, centralized
registration and deposit within the Library, simultaneously bolstering its
holdings and increasing copyright registrations. 12 Spofford also created a
Copyright Department within the Library to administer its new
responsibilities. 13 The first Register of Copyrights, Thorvald Solberg, was
named in 1897 and served for 33 years.14
Since its inception, the bulk of the Office’s duties have been
administrative.15 It reviews registration applications; it receives deposit copies;
it records facts related to registrations and assignments; it collects and
disburses royalties under compulsory licenses. 16 This work is crucial to a
functioning copyright system. In particular, an accurate record of copyrighted
works and their corresponding rights holders benefits authors, publishers,
licensees, and the public more generally.17 Such a record allows the public to
reliably determine whether a work is protected in the first place. It also
facilitates transactions, making sure creators can be paid for their work. 18
Moreover, it provides opportunities for researching the copyright system and
its effects on creative production.
In addition to its primary administrative duties, the Office took an active
role in copyright policy early in its history. Befitting an arm of the Library of
Congress, the Office has consistently weighed in on legislative amendments to
the Copyright Act. Beginning in 1901, Solberg authored a series of annual
reports calling on Congress to revise the Act.19 In the lead up to what became
the Copyright Act of 1909, the Office organized a series of stakeholder
conferences to discuss reform proposals and produced a draft bill.20 At the

12. See WILLIAM F. PATRY, 7 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT §
ON COPYRIGHT].

26:1 (2018) [hereinafter 7 PATRY

13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See Maria A. Pallante, The Next Great Copyright Act, 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 315, 341
(2013) (“In fact, from 1897 to 1998, the role was largely, though not entirely, administrative,
meaning most regulations addressed administrative questions, i.e., rules pertaining to the
registration process, the collection of fees, and the administration of certain aspects of
compulsory licenses.”).
16. U.S. Copyright Office, A Brief Introduction and History, https://www.copyright.gov/
circs/circ1a.html [https://perma.cc/DX58-5AMW] (last visited Nov. 19, 2018).
17. See Maria A. Pallante, The Next Generation Copyright Office: What It Means and Why It
Matters, 61 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 213, 228–29 (2014).
18. See James Gibson, Once and Future Copyright, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167, 227–28
(2005).
19. See LIBRARIAN OF CONGRESS, REPORT OF THE LIBRARIAN OF CONGRESS FOR THE
FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1901 at 11 (1901); 7 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 12, at
§ 26:2.
20. Zvi S. Rosen, The (First) Register of Copyrights and the Drafting of the 1909 Copyright Act,
MOSTLY IP HISTORY (May 12, 2017), http://www.zvirosen.com/2017/05/12/the-first-



738

BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 33:733

request of Congress, the Office prepared dozens of influential studies of
substantive legal questions during the decades-long process that culminated in
the Copyright Act of 1976.21 The Office has also been involved in debates over
international copyright treaties since the early twentieth century.22
The current statute outlines the responsibilities of the Office with some
specificity. In addition to performing “all administrative functions and
duties”23 required to implement the Act—and creating regulations necessary
to do the same24—the Office is to advise Congress, inform and assist federal
agencies and the judiciary, engage with foreign governments and
intergovernmental organizations, and conduct studies related to copyright
law.25 As discussed below, these duties have been supplemented by legislation
empowering the Office to engage in specific rulemaking.
Given this mix of duties, the Office is a rather curious creature within our
constitutional system. On the one hand, because it is housed within the Library
of Congress, the Office would appear, as a structural matter, squarely within
the legislative branch.26 The frequent research and policy input that Congress
requires from the Office bolster that view. On the other hand, the Office’s
administrative functions—promulgating rules and administering aspects of a
complex federal statute—are more consistent with an executive agency. In
addition, the Librarian, who oversees the Register and the Office, is a
presidential appointee.27


register-of-copyrights-and-the-drafting-of-the-1909-copyright-act/
[https://perma.cc/
RY2E-GH6D].
21. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION STUDIES,
https://www.copyright.gov/history/studies.html [https://perma.cc/Q3M8-UJB8]; see 7
PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 12, at § 26:3.
22. See 7 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 12, at § 26:2.
23. 17 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2012).
24. See 17 U.S.C. § 702.
25. See 17 U.S.C. § 701(b).
26. See 5 U.S.C. § 5531(4) (defining the Library of Congress, along with the Government
Accountability Office, the Government Publishing Office, the Office of Technology
Assessment, the Office of the Architect of the Capitol, the United States Botanic Garden, the
Congressional Budget Office, and the United States Capitol Police as an “agency in the
legislative branch”).
27. See 2 U.S.C. § 136-1 (“The President shall appoint the Librarian of Congress, by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate.”).
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When it comes to deciding in which branch of the federal government the
Office belongs, the courts are split.28 Likewise, both members of Congress29
and the executive branch30 have expressed consternation over the question.
President Clinton went so far as to issue a signing statement accompanying the
DMCA, which vested the Office with new substantive rulemaking
responsibilities, declaring that “for constitutional purposes” the Office is an
“executive branch entity.”31 And while the Office proclaims itself a part of the
legislative branch, 32 it frequently acts as if it were an executive agency and

28. Some courts have concluded that the Office is part of the legislative branch. See, e.g.,
United States v. Brooks, 945 F. Supp. 830, 834 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (“[T]he Copyright Office is
part of the legislative branch.”); Harry Fox Agency, Inc. v. Mills Music, Inc., 720 F.2d 733,
736 (2d Cir. 1983) (“[T]he Library of Congress . . . is a part of the legislative branch
itself . . . .”); Barger v. Mumford, 265 F.2d 380, 382 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (“[T]he Library of
Congress has long been treated as being in or under the jurisdiction of the legislative
branch . . . .”). Other courts have deemed the Office executive in nature. See, e.g., Eltra Corp.
v. Ringer, 579 F.2d 294, 301 (4th Cir. 1978) (“[T]he Copyright Office is an executive
office . . . .”); Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 684 F.3d 1332, 1342
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (discussing why the Library of Congress “is undoubtedly a ‘component of the
Executive Branch’ ”). Acknowledging that “it is not clear whether the Library of Congress is
part of the executive or legislative branch,” the Ninth Circuit explicitly avoided the question
in Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. Aereokiller, LLC, 851 F.3d 1002, 1013 n.4 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting
that if it were to decide what level of deference the Office is owed, the court “would be
required to rule on constitutional questions that could have outsized consequences relative to
this case—such as determining whether the Library of Congress is a legislative or executive
agency”).
29. Senator Orin Hatch, for example, has maintained that “the Copyright Office is in the
legislative branch of the Government, [and] whenever [it] is tasked with an executive-type
function, [a] constitutional question arises.” See John Duffy, Peter Strauss & Michael Herz,
Copyright’s Constitutional Chameleon, CONCURRING OPINIONS (May 17, 2013),
https://concurringopinions.com/archives/2013/05/copyrights-constitutional-chameleon
.html#more-74811 [https://perma.cc/NU7E-UUCQ]; see also H.R. REP. NO. 105-796, at 77
(1998) (Conf. Rep.) (referring to the Office as “a hybrid entity that historically has performed
both legislative and executive or administrative functions” and as “a legislative branch
agency”).
30. A 1996 Office of Legal Counsel memo cautioned that entities such as the Library of
Congress, “exercise authority that seems incompatible or at least difficult to reconcile with the
Supreme Court’s anti-aggrandizement decisions.” Constitutional Separation of Powers
Between the President and Cong., 20 Op. O.L.C. 124, 172 (1996).
31. Presidential Statement on Signing the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 2 PUB.
PAPERS 1902 (Oct. 28, 1998) (“I am advised by the Department of Justice that certain
provisions of H.R. 2281 and the accompanying Conference Report regarding the Register of
Copyrights raise serious constitutional concerns. Contrary to assertions in the Conference
Report, the Copyright Office is, for constitutional purposes, an executive branch entity.”).
32. See U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 16 (“As a service unit of the Library of
Congress, the Copyright Office is part of the legislative branch of government.”). In remarks
addressing constitutional challenges to copyright law, then-Register Marybeth Peters explained
that “being in the legislative branch, my office is institutionally disinclined to take kindly to
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accepts that characterization when it is expedient.33
This ambiguity raises important constitutional questions. If the Office is
an arm of Congress, its substantive rulemaking would appear to violate the
separation of powers by subverting the processes for lawmaking set out in
Article I.34 Perhaps not surprisingly, the Office’s authority has been challenged
on constitutional grounds. In Eltra Corporation v. Ringer, the plaintiff brought
an action seeking to compel the Register of Copyrights to register its typeface
design after the Office refused.35 Eltra maintained that the Office, as an arm
of the legislature, lacked the power to refuse registration applications.36 Under
Eltra’s view, the Office’s power is “very strictly limited to the receipt, deposit
and issuance of a registration certificate.” 37 However, the Fourth Circuit
rejected that argument, focusing instead on the Office’s longstanding practices
of issuing rules and regulations.38
Notably, Eltra was decided before two important Supreme Court
separation of powers cases. These cases embrace a formal rather than
functional approach to situating entities like the Office within the legislative or
executive branches, and potentially undermine Eltra’s analysis. 39 Thus,

challenges to the constitutionality of copyright legislation.” Marybeth Peters, Constitutional
Challenges to Copyright Law, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 509, 509 (2007). The Librarian of Congress
has offered similar characterizations. See Duffy et al., supra note 29 (noting that the “Librarian
has repeatedly testified to Congress that the Library is ‘arm of the United States Congress,’ a
‘branch of the Legislative branch,’ and ‘a unique part of the Legislative Branch of the
government’ ”).
33. See, e.g., Eltra Corp. v. Ringer, 579 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1978). The Copyright Royalty
Board has faced its own constitutional challenges. See Live365, Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd.,
698 F. Supp. 2d 25 (2010); Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 684 F.3d
1332, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“[W]e agree with Intercollegiate that the position of the CRJs, as
currently constituted, violates the Appointments Clause . . . .”). The Department of Justice, on
behalf of the Library of Congress, has argued in the context of a CRB dispute that the Library
is an executive department for Appointments Clause purposes. See Brief for the Federal
Respondents in Opposition at 16, Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd.,
684 F.3d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (No. 12-928), 2013 WL 1792498, at *15.
34. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 501 U.S.
252, 276 (1991) (“If the power is executive, the Constitution does not permit an agent of
Congress to exercise it. If the power is legislative, Congress must exercise it in conformity with
the bicameralism and presentment requirements of Art. I, § 7.”). For a thorough discussion
of the constitutional issues surrounding the Office’s rulemaking authority, see Andy Gass,
Considering Copyright Rulemaking: The Constitutional Question, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1047
(2012).
35. See Eltra Corp., 579 F.2d at 296.
36. See id. at 301.
37. Id. at 298.
38. See id. at 298–299.
39. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); Metro. Wash. Airports, 501 U.S. at 269
(1991); see also Gass, supra note 34, at 1053–56.
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questions about the extent of the Office’s constitutional authority linger. More
recently, when the Office recommended and the Librarian approved an
exemption under the DMCA that permitted the unlocking of mobile phones,
Tracfone filed a challenge to the rulemaking, arguing that it represented either
an intra-branch delegation of legislative authority or the exercise of executive
power by the legislature. 40 The constitutional question was left unsolved,
however, because Tracfone dropped the suit after successfully suing phone
unlockers despite the exemption.41
Concerns over the Office’s constitutional authority have contributed to a
number of proposals for its reorganization and the redistribution of its duties.
A bill introduced in 2015 would have transformed the Office into an
independent quasi-executive agency.42 And in 2017, the House passed a bill
that stripped the Librarian of Congress of her power to name the next Register
of Copyrights.43 Instead, the Register would be chosen by the President from
a list of candidates generated by a congressional panel.44 Commentators have
suggested some duties currently within the purview of the Office could be
better carried out by the Departments of Justice or Commerce, the latter of
which houses the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.45 Others have raised the
possibility of relocating the Office within Commerce or creating a new and
independent IP agency.46 But the recent attention to the Office is motivated
by more than an abstract concern over the separation of powers. Rather,
changes in the leadership of both the Library and the Office are at least partly
responsible.
In 2015, longtime Librarian of Congress James Billington, first appointed

40. Complaint at 2, Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. Billington, No. 06-22942 (S.D. Fla. Dec.
5, 2006).
41. See David Kravets, Ruling Allows Cell Phone Unlocking, but Telco Sues Anyway, WIRED
(Aug. 8, 2007), https://www.wired.com/2007/08/tracfone [https://perma.cc/2CN5-79KE].
42. See Copyright Office for the Digital Economy Act, H.R. 4241, 114th Cong. (2015).
43. See Register of Copyrights Selection and Accountability Act, H.R. 1695, 115th Cong.
(2017).
44. See id.
45. See Jarrett Dieterle & Sasha Moss, Moving Copyright Office Authorities to Executive Branch
Could Improve Accountability, HILL (Mar. 28, 2017), http://thehill.com/blogs/punditsblog/lawmaker-news/326246-moving-copyright-office-authorities-to-executive-branch
[https://perma.cc/XQ56-Z7RH] (“Internet-related procedural functions like notice-andtakedown and circumvention exemptions could be placed in the Commerce Department.
Statutory licensing and rate-setting issues, such as through the Copyright Royalty Board, could
be moved into the Department of Justice, which has substantial antitrust expertise.”).
46. See Sandra M. Aistars, The Next Great Copyright Act, or A New Great Copyright Agency?,
38 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 339, 346 (2015). The Omnibus Patent Act of 1996 would have created
a government corporation uniting the functions of the Copyright Office and the USPTO. See
Omnibus Patent Act of 1996, S. 1961, 104th Cong. (1996).



742

BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 33:733

by President Reagan, retired amid considerable controversy. 47 A series of
inspector general reports revealed a pattern of mismanagement within the
Library. 48 In particular, the Library’s embrace of digital technology was
woefully anemic. This inadequate technological infrastructure of the Library
had a direct impact on the Office,49 fueling calls by the Register for greater
independence.50
The Office, however, has dealt with its own missteps in recent years. After
working for the better part of a decade to digitize pre-1978 registrations, the
Office succeeded, at long last, in scanning its card catalog. But that catalog is
not searchable, nor does it include registration records. 51 And while new
registration applications can be filed electronically, the Office continued to
insist on paper records for registering DMCA agents until 2016.52 Furthermore,
a recent Inspector General report found that the Office’s ultimately
abandoned Electronic Licensing System, originally budgeted at just over $1
million, consumed almost $12 million over six years—overruns that the Office
failed to disclose to Congress.53

47. See Michael D. Shear, Library of Congress Chief Retires Under Fire, N.Y. TIMES (June 10,
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/11/us/library-of-congress-chief-james-hadleybillington-leaving-after-nearly-3-decades.html [https://perma.cc/MA9Y-G976] (noting that
Billington “presided over a series of management and technology failures at the library that
were documented in more than a dozen reports by government watchdog agencies”); Peggy
McGlone, Librarian’s Trips Abroad, Posh Hotels All Paid for by James Madison Council, WASH. POST
(Aug. 12, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/entertainment/museums/jamesmadison-council-a-whos-who-of-philanthropists-and-titans/2015/08/12/a12f55c2-3f7811e5-9561-4b3dc93e3b9a_story.html?utm_term=.8f20c9b54d1e [https://perma.cc/Q7C35FX5].
48. See, e.g., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL,
SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 7 (Sept. 2015), https://www.loc.gov/portals/static
/about/office-of-the-inspector-general/annual-reports/documents/september-2015-semi
annual-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/7YS3-5FAZ] (noting “significant strategic and
operational issues in the Library’s information technology (IT) infrastructure and
management” dating back to 2009).
49. See Peggy McGlone, Copyright Office’s Online Registration Hasn’t Worked for Almost a
Week, WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/
copyright-offices-online-registration-hasnt-worked-for-almost-a-week/2015/09/03/
b12781e2-5261-11e5-9812-92d5948a40f8_story.html?utm_term=.f77d1ddd4bb3
[https://perma.cc/28PH-W3T4].
50. See U.S. Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-Calif.), Statement in Opposition to H.R. 1695,
https://lofgren.house.gov/sites/lofgren.house.gov/files/migrated/UploadedFiles/Dissentin
g_Views_Markup_03-29-17_Copyright_Bill_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/5TMA-P6LA].
51. See id.
52. See Designation of Agent to Receive Notification of Claimed Infringement, 81 Fed.
Reg. 75,695 (Nov. 1, 2016) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201).
53. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, FY 16 REVIEW OF
SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT LIFECYCLE 8 (Feb. 2017).
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In 2016, both the Library and the Office underwent changes in leadership.
That year, President Obama nominated Carla Hayden, former president of the
American Library Association, as James Billington’s successor as Librarian of
Congress. 54 As Librarian, Hayden has taken a more active role than her
predecessor, particularly with respect to issues surrounding technology and
information accessibility.55 And in October of 2017, Hayden reassigned thenRegister Pallante, who resigned in protest. 56 In the wake of that news,
speculation ran rampant that Google, long seen as hostile to the entertainment
industry, was behind Hayden’s decision.57
In some ways, blaming industry influence for the seemingly abrupt change
of leadership within the Office is an understandable impulse. Industry
connections have shaped Office staffing in the past.58 Pallante formerly served
as the Executive Director of the National Writers Union and Assistant
Director of the Authors Guild, 59 and she was named President of the
Association of American Publishers just weeks after leaving the Office. 60
Similarly, the Office’s current Acting Register formerly served as Vice
President for Litigation and Legal Affairs at the Recording Industry

54. See Nicholas Fandos, Carla Hayden Nominated to Head Library of Congress, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 24, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/25/us/carla-hayden-nominated-tohead-library-of-congress.html [https://perma.cc/G24W-WKG7].
55. See Carla Hayden, Librarian of Cong., Hearing on Fiscal Year 2017 Budgets for
Legislative Branch Entities, Remarks Before the House Administration Committee (Feb. 6,
2017) (“[H]igh on my priority list is modernization of the Copyright Office. It must be
accessible to its users; registration must be user-friendly; and a searchable database of
copyright holders should be available. These improvements will make an enormous difference
to this important segment of the American economy.”).
56. See Resignation Letter from Maria Pallante, then-Register of Copyrights, to Carla
Hayden, Librarian of Cong. (Oct. 24, 2016).
57. See Peggy McGlone, Songwriters Say This Federal Bureaucrat Championed Their Rights. Now
She’s Lost Her Job, WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
entertainment/music/with-change-at-the-top-of-copyright-office-a-battle-brews-over-freecontent/2016/11/07/a8c0b140-a4ea-11e6-8042-f4d111c862d1_story.html?utm_term=
.3091cfcb879f [https://perma.cc/7MQD-YGVQ]; A Copyright Coup in Washington, WALL ST.
J. (Nov. 2, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-copyright-coup-in-washington1478127088 [https://perma.cc/QZ47-X5ZZ].
58. MEREDITH ROSE, RYAN CLOUGH & RAZA PANJWANI, CAPTURED: SYSTEMIC BIAS
AT THE U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE 4 (2016) (“The Office has a well-trodden revolving door
between its leadership, its other legal and policy staff and major rightsholders and their
representatives.”).
59. See id. at 5.
60. See Press Release, Ass’n of Am. Publishers, The Association of American Publishers
(AAP) Names Maria A. Pallante as President and CEO (Jan. 12, 2017),
http://newsroom.publishers.org/the-association-of-american-publishers-aap-names-maria-apallante-as-president-and-ceo/ [https://perma.cc/D65F-HLN6].
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Association of America.61 So when a personnel change that copyright holders
found objectionable occurred, it was perhaps natural for them to assume a
larger, more powerful industry influence was to blame.
But there is a simpler explanation. A Register who neglects and
mismanages the Office’s core functions, while publicly advocating for
independence from her immediate supervisor, may find herself in a precarious
position under reinvigorated leadership.62
Given its recent upheaval, the lingering questions about the scope of its
authority, and the related reorganization proposals, now is an opportune
moment to take stock of the Office’s expertise. As the next Part will
demonstrate, the Office has earned the right to assert its expertise with respect
to a number of questions at the heart of its regular administrative duties.
III.

THE OFFICE’S EXPERTISE

One of the core justifications for granting agencies regulatory authority is
expertise.63 An expert agency brings greater substantive knowledge, experience,
and skill to bear on complex problems, giving the public confidence in its
determinations. Both rulemaking authority and judicial deference to agency
interpretations depend in large part on the assumption of agency expertise.
Despite its centrality in administrative law, expertise remains a poorly
defined concept. 64 Intuitively, we understand expertise as a function of

61. ROSE, CLOUGH & PANJWANI, supra note 58, at 5.
62. See 7 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 12, at § 26:4 (2018) (the problems identified
in the 2017 Inspector General’s report as well as “Pallante’s continued lobbying for the
Copyright Office to become an independent agency, may have led to her replacement by
Librarian of Congress Carla Hayden”); Annemarie Bridy, Murder (or not) at the Library of
Congress?, WASH. POST (Oct. 31, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2016/10/31/murder-or-not-at-the-library-of-congress/?utm_term=
.b514e5bab48b [https://perma.cc/73HF-676S] (providing as “a simple and plausible
explanation” for Pallante’s removal her “fairly brazen” effort “to withdraw [the Office] from
the [Library], of which it has been a part since 1897”).
63. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139–40 (1944) (noting the administrator’s
“specialized experience and broader investigations and information” and concluding that its
rulings and interpretations “constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which
courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance”); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194,
199, 201–07 (1947) (noting the Commission’s “accumulated experience” enabled it to make
“an informed, expert judgment on the problem”); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (suggesting that Congress deferred to the administrator
because of its “great expertise” and noting that “judges are not experts in the field”); United
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001) (identifying an agency’s “relative expertness”
as a factor in determining the appropriate degree of deference).
64. See Sidney A. Shapiro, The Failure to Understand Expertise in Administrative Law: The
Problem and the Consequences, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1097, 1097 (2015) (“For a concept that
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repeated experience.65 But often the assumption seems to be that expertise—
whatever it is—emerges from the delegation of authority to an agency.66 On
occasion, though, courts have recognized that an agency’s general expertise
within a field is no guarantee that expertise supports every exercise of its
authority.67
In one of the few serious attempts to move beyond our intuitive notion of
what it means to be an expert, Sidney Shapiro, a leading commentator on
administrative procedure and regulatory policy, draws on the work of
sociologists Harry Collins and Robert Evans to outline a number of distinct
types of expertise.68 Two varieties of specialized expertise, contributory and
interactional, are particularly useful in thinking about the scope and strength
of an agency’s claimed expertise. Contributory expertise “is the knowledge
necessary to undertake an activity with the competence expected of those who
are trained in a discipline.”69 If you possess contributory expertise, you can
meaningfully engage in a particular activity or practice. A chef, for example,
has contributory expertise when it comes to creating and executing a recipe.
In contrast, “interactional expertise is the mastery of the language of a
specialized domain” that falls short of practical competence.70 So a food critic
may have interactional expertise, even if she lacks the ability to prepare a
gourmet meal. These specialized forms of expertise can be acquired through
both formal education and experience.71 Administrative officials in particular,
Shapiro argues, can develop expertise “in the assessment of conflicting
evidence and arguments, disciplinary perspectives, political demands, and legal
commands.”72
Consistent with this framework, the Office’s claim to expertise is strongest

is so central to administrative law, there has been a surprisingly impoverished understanding
of expertise and its role in the rulemaking process.”).
65. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1667, 1678 (1975) (describing expertise as “the knowledge that comes from specialized
experience”).
66. See, e.g., Douglas H. Ginsburg, Appellate Courts and Independent Experts, 60 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 303, 318 (2010) (“The agencies, of course, develop expertise in the field or the
industry they are charged with regulating.”).
67. See, e.g., De La Mota v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 412 F.3d 71, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding
that the interpretation did not reflect agency expertise); Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Serv., 353 F.3d 1051, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003) (agency decision did not “reflect the
product of specialized agency expertise”); Hall v. EPA, 273 F.3d 1146, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001)
(holding that EPA’s decision did not reflect expertise).
68. See Shapiro, supra note 64, at 1102–05.
69. Id. at 1103.
70. Id. at 1104.
71. Id. at 1104–05.
72. Id. at 1105.
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when it comes to questions that leverage its unique institutional knowledge
and the insights generated by routinely confronting issues in the course of its
administrative duties. 73 For most of the Office’s history, those duties have
centered on its “ministerial functions, such as registration and deposit.”74 The
Office’s expertise, however, is not limited to administrative mechanics. Rather,
registration entails meaningful substantive evaluation of a work. In addition,
the Office is uniquely situated to administer and interpret certain aspects of
the statutory licenses under its care, some of which it has managed for over a
century.75
A.

SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS FOR REGISTRATION

The bulk of the Office’s resources and, by extension, expertise are directed
to copyright registration.76 Nearly half of Office staff work in the registration
division. 77 And in fiscal year 2016 alone, the Office received 533,606
registrations claims.78 Given that volume and the relatively low standards for

73. The Office has at times overestimated its role, envisioning itself as the primary, if not
sole, interpreter of the text of the Copyright Act. For example, in suggesting the American
Law Institute should “reconsider” the existence of its Restatement of Copyright Law, Acting
Register Karyn Temple expressed the view that the blackletter law of copyright requires no
further explanation and that, in any event, “[t]here can be no more accurate statement of the
law than the words that Congress has enacted in the Copyright Act and those that the
Copyright Office has adopted in its regulations.” See Claggett, supra note 1. Aside from ignoring
the crucial role of courts in interpreting the Act, this view wildly overstates the degree of clarity
and consensus on core questions of copyrightability, infringement, exceptions, and limitations.
It also reflects an inflated understanding of the Office’s place in the copyright system.
74. Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87, 148 (2004).
75. Even within the core of the Office’s expertise, however, courts typically afford its
determinations deference only to the extent they find them persuasive. See generally WILLIAM
F. PATRY, 5 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 17:102 (2018) [hereinafter 5 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT];
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 2 NIMMER ON Copyright § 7.26 (2018) [hereinafter
2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT].
76. As Joseph Liu points out in his contribution to this volume, 28% of the Office’s
regulations relate directly to registration. See Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Rulemaking: Past as Prologue,
33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 628, 634 (2018).
77. See Karyn Temple Claggett, Meet the U.S. Copyright Office: Creativity at Work, LIBRARY
OF CONGRESS (March 9, 2017), https://blogs.loc.gov/copyright/2017/03/meet-the-u-scopyright-office-creativity-at-work/ [https://perma.cc/3AU5-LZJJ] (noting that the Office
has a staff of roughly 400 employees); LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, FISCAL 2018 BUDGET
JUSTIFICATION 115 (2018), https://www.loc.gov/portals/static/about/reports-and-budgets/
documents/budgets/fy2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q5MN-6EH6] (noting that “the
registration staff lost approximately 25% (50 FTE) of its examining staff” since 2010); Email
from Erik Bertin, Deputy Dir. of Registration Policy and Practice, to Aaron Perzanowski (May
10, 2018, 10:05AM) (stating that more than 150 employees work within the registration
division) (on file with the author).
78. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, FISCAL 2016 ANNUAL REPORT 9 (2016),
https://www.copyright.gov/reports/annual/2016/ar2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XTL3
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copyrightability under U.S. law, the Office does not conduct a probing analysis
of each work.79 Nonetheless, it does engage in a meaningful, if understandably
limited, evaluation that results in a non-trivial refusal rate.80 Many of those
refusals result from the failure to satisfy one or more of the substantive
requirements for copyrightability.81 So one should expect the Office to have
considerable contributory expertise—gained through both formal training and
longstanding experience—in applying the legislative and judicial standards for
originality, subject matter, and the useful article doctrine, in addition to the
formal requirements of registration.82
Under its interpretation of the statutory language and relevant precedent,
the Office has long maintained that “words and short phrases . . . familiar
symbols or designs; mere variations of typographic ornamentation, lettering or
coloring” are not subject to copyright.83 The Office has relied on that reading
to refuse registrations for a variety of works. 84 The en banc Third Circuit
opinion in Southco v. Kanebridge, authored by then-Judge Alito, characterized the
Office’s approach as “reflect[ing] a ‘body of experience and informed
judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.’ ”85

CZHY] [hereinafter FISCAL 2016 REPORT]. That same year, the Office recorded 10,865
documents reflecting assignments, licenses, and other transactions relating to 197,000 works.
And it forwarded some 635,000 deposited copies of works to the Library of Congress. Id.
79. Robert Kasunic, Copyright from Inside the Box: A View from the U.S. Copyright Office
Keynote Address, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 311, 318 (2016) (“The registration process simply
examines the claim and the deposit and seeks to ensure that the legal and formal requirements
of a claim in copyright are met in accordance with our longstanding institutional expertise in
these questions.”).
80. See id. at 315 (noting a roughly 5% refusal rate). In recent years, the refusal rate was
lower. See FISCAL 2016 REPORT, supra note 78, at 9 (noting that the Office processed 469,455
applications, of which 12,656 were rejected, a rate of roughly 2.7%).
81. See generally REVIEW BOARD LETTERS ONLINE, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF.,
https://www.copyright.gov/rulings-filings/review-board/index.html
[https://perma.cc/
A45X-ZV7P] (last visited Nov. 20, 2018).
82. Of course, acknowledging the Office’s expertise does not mean that it always reaches
the correct result with respect to particular interpretations or specific works.
83. 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (2018).
84. See, e.g., Letter from Regan A. Smith, Copyright Office Review Bd., to Bryce J.
Maynard (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.copyright.gov/rulings-filings/review-board/docs/livlogo.pdf [https://perma.cc/DL6G-PU5T] (affirming the Board’s refusal to register the
copyright); Letter from Catherine Rowland, Copyright Office Review Bd., to B. Anna McCoy
(Sept. 20, 2017), https://www.copyright.gov/rulings-filings/review-board/ docs/rub-dirt.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W32X-983S] (affirming the Board’s refusal to register the copyright);
Letter from Regan A. Smith, Copyright Office Review Bd., to Michael L. Gentlesk, II (Aug.
23,
2016),
https://www.copyright.gov/rulings-filings/review-board/docs/fuck-snowglobe.pdf [https://perma.cc/7WCX-NMEC] (affirming the Board’s refusal to register the
copyright).
85. Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 390 F.3d 276, 286 n.5 (3d Cir. 2004)). The court
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Similarly, Office regulations tracking section 102(b) of the Copyright Act
exclude “ideas, plans, methods, systems, or devices, as distinguished from the
particular manner in which they are expressed or described in a writing.”86 This
prohibition, too, has formed the basis for refusals to register.87 In 2012, the
Office issued additional guidance in the form of a policy statement clarifying
that compilations comprised of otherwise ineligible systems or methods were
not registrable.88 For example, the Office explained that “a compilation of yoga
poses, may be precluded from registration as a functional system or process in
cases where the particular movements and the order in which they are to be
performed are said to result in improvements in one’s health or physical or
mental condition.”89 The Central District of California, confronting just such
a claim, deferred to the Office’s policy, citing the “specialized experience,
broader investigations, and information available to [it].”90
The Office also has “considerable expertise” evaluating the separability of
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural elements of useful articles. 91 Such
“determinations are routinely made by the Register and are unquestionably
related to the substantive area of the agency’s business.”92 Separability is the
sort of question in which the “Office continually engages,”93 prompting at least
one court to conclude that “the Copyright Office’s expertise in identifying and

explained that the “Office’s longstanding practice of denying registration to short phrases
merits deference,” although it declined to clarify the precise degree of deference warranted. Id.
at 286; see also N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 2d
527, 543 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d 497 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2007) (“The Copyright Office’s longstanding practice is to deny Copyright protection to words and short phrases, and courts have
found that the policies and interpretation of the Office are entitled to deference.”); Garcia v.
Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 741 (9th Cir. 2015) (crediting the Office’s “expert opinion” barring
“a copyright claim by an individual actor or actress in his or her performance contained within
a motion picture”).
86. 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(b).
87. See, e.g., Letter from Chris Weston, Copyright Office Review Bd., to Ali Fayad (May
9, 2017), https://www.copyright.gov/rulings-filings/review-board/docs/converse-flowdepths.pdf [https://perma.cc/52J3-T22K] (affirming the Board’s refusal to register the
copyright).
88. See Registration of Claims to Copyright, 77 Fed. Reg. 37605, (Jun. 22, 2012) (codified
at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201).
89. Id. at 37607.
90. Bikram’s Yoga Coll. of India, L.P. v. Evolation Yoga, LLC, 105 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1162, 1165 n.5 (C.D. Cal 2012), aff’d 803 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2015).
91. Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1978); see also Eltra Corp. v.
Ringer, 579 F.2d 294, 297–98 (4th Cir.1978); Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799
F.3d 468, 480 (6th Cir. 2015), aff’d sub nom. Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137
S. Ct. 1002 (2017) (“The Copyright Office unquestionably has experience identifying useful
articles and pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works.”).
92. Norris Indust., Inc. v. Int’l. Tel. & Tel. Corp., 696 F.2d 918, 922 (11th Cir. 1983).
93. Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 994 (2d Cir. 1980).
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thinking about the difference between art and function surpasses ours.”94 The
Office’s approach to separability has been criticized for its inconsistency.95 But
in fairness to the Office, the courts have not fared much better.96
B.

FORMAL REQUIREMENTS FOR REGISTRATION

In addition to the substantive standards for copyrightability, a registration
application must meet certain formal requirements.97 Beyond the statutory text,
Congress granted the Office specific rulemaking authority to determine a range
of issues related to registration: the administrative classes in which works
should be placed; the specific deposit requirements for each class; and whether
“a single registration for a group of related works” is sufficient. 98 Since
registration or refusal are statutory prerequisites for an infringement
suit,99courts consider whether these formal obligations have been satisfied with

94. Varsity Brands, 799 F.3d at 480; see also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 214 (1954)
(concluding that “as a standard we can hardly do better than the words of the present
[Copyright Office] Regulation”).
95. The Chief of the Examining Division at one time explained that “the office has taken
almost every conceivable position” on the question. WILLIAM F. PATRY, 2 PATRY ON
COPYRIGHT § 3:139.10 (2018) [hereinafter 2 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT].
96. See Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. 1002 (holding that “an artistic feature of the design of a
useful article is eligible for copyright protection if the feature (1) can be perceived as a two- or
three-dimensional work of art separate from the useful article and (2) would qualify as a
protectable pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work either on its own or in some other medium
if imagined separately from the useful article”); Kisselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d 989 (determining that
ornamental features of belt buckles were conceptually separable “sculptural elements” partly
on the basis of the reactions of customers, critics, and experts); Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade
Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987) (determining that sculptural elements of a bike
rack were not separable because they did not reflect “the designer’s artistic judgment exercised
independently of functional influences”); Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d
411 (2d Cir. 1985) (determining that expressive features of mannequins were not conceptually
separable on the basis of an objective analysis of the work and its function); see also Masquerade
Novelty, Inc. v. Unique Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 663, 670 (3d Cir. 1990) (“Courts have twisted
themselves into knots trying to create a test to effectively ascertain whether the artistic aspects
of a useful article can be identified separately from and exist independently of the article’s
utilitarian function.”).
97. See 17 U.S.C. § 409 (2012).
98. 17 U.S.C. § 408(c)(1) (authorizing specification by regulation the administrative
classes for purposes of deposit and registration); 37 C.F.R. § 202.3(b)(5)–(9) (2018) (setting
out requirements for group registration); see 17 U.S.C. § 408(c)(2) (requiring the Office to
“establish regulations specifically permitting a single registration for a group of works by the
same individual author, all first published as contributions to periodicals, including
newspapers . . .”).
99. The Supreme Court will soon decide whether registration occurs once the Office
renders a decision or merely when a registration application has been submitted to the Office.
See Fourth Estate Pub. Ben. Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (2018) (granting
certiorari).
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some regularity.100 And those courts generally recognize the Office’s expertise
in evaluating the formal adequacy of an application.
In Alaska Stock v. Houghton Mifflin, the Ninth Circuit considered whether
registration of a large number of photographs as a single collective work
constituted registration of the underlying individual images.101 The collective
registration omitted the names of many of the authors as well as the titles of
the individual photos, which defendant Houghton Mifflin argued conflicted
with the plain meaning of the statute. 102 The Office’s longstanding
interpretation of the statute permits applications for collective works, and the
component works contained therein, “even if the application does not specify
the authors and titles of the component works.” 103 But since the Office’s
position was expressed through “internal agency manuals and opinion letters,”
the court was bound by them “only to the extent that those interpretations
have the power to persuade.”104 Nonetheless, the Office’s thirty-year history
of interpreting and applying the provisions of the 1976 Act, and its intimate
exposure to the practical considerations collective works present convinced
the court to accept the Office’s approach.105 Other courts have been divided
on the extent to which they are ultimately persuaded by the Office’s approach
to collective registration, but none have questioned the Office’s unique
insights into the problem, and implicit recognition of the Office’s contributory
expertise in making the legal determinations inherent in registration
decisions.106

100. The Supreme Court has clarified that despite the statute’s insistence that “no civil
action for infringement . . . shall be instituted” absent registration or refusal, the Supreme
Court has held that § 411 does not restrict a federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction
involving claims of unregistered works. Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 157,
170–71 (2010).
101. Alaska Stock, LLC v. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publ'g Co., 747 F.3d 673, 675 (9th
Cir. 2014).
102. Id. at 679–80.
103. Id. at 677.
104. Id. at 685; see Muench Photography Inc. v. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publ’g Co.,
712 F. Supp. 2d 84, 91–95 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (applying Chevron deference to regulations
promulgated under § 408(c) and Skidmore deference to Office circulars and the Compendium
automated database registration but said the works were not properly registered).
105. Alaska Stock, 747 F.3d at 678 (noting that “this has been the Copyright Office
interpretation ‘[f]or more than thirty years’ ” and that “collective works, such as newspapers
and magazines, can contain hundreds—if not thousands—of copyrightable works that the
claimant owns but did not author”).
106. Compare Metro. Reg’l Info. Sys. v. Am. Home Realty Network, Inc., 722 F.3d 591,
597–99 (4th Cir. 2013) (following the Office’s interpretation); Morris v. Bus. Concepts, Inc.,
283 F.3d 502, 505–06 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding the Office’s position persuasive), with Muench
Photography, 712 F. Supp. 2d at 94 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[A]sking the Court flatly to ignore the
requirement that the authors’ names be listed . . . goes a bridge too far.”); Bean v. Houghton
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ADMINISTRATION OF STATUTORY LICENSES

The Copyright Act contains a variety of statutory licenses that permit
specified uses of protected works so long as the user complies with the relevant
formalities and pays the required royalties to copyright holders.107 Many of
these provisions direct the Office to prescribe regulations for the filing of
relevant documentation.108
The Office has been in the business of administering one of those statutory
licenses, the mechanical license, for more than a century—since the advent of
player pianos prompted Congress to include it in the Copyright Act of 1909.109
Today, the Office collects royalties under statutory licenses, including the
cable, satellite, and digital audio recording licenses.110 In 2016, those royalties
totaled more than $240 million that was eventually dispersed to copyright
holders.111
Rates under these and other licenses have been set by the Copyright
Royalty Board (CRB), a separate division of the Library of Congress, since
2005. 112 The three-judge CRB panel is designed to offer expertise in both

Mifflin Harcourt Publ’g Co., 2010 WL 3168624, at *4 (D. Ariz. Aug. 10, 2010) (holding that
registrations of collective works containing photographs were insufficient to permit individual
photographers to sue for infringement).
107. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 111(d) (2012) (providing for a statutory license for secondary
transmissions by cable systems); § 112(e) (providing for a statutory license for ephemeral
recordings); § 114(f) (providing for a statutory license for certain digital audio transmissions);
§ 115 (providing for a statutory license to make and distribute phonorecords); § 119
(providing for a statutory license for secondary transmissions by satellite carriers); § 122
(providing for a statutory license for secondary transmissions of local television programming
by satellite carriers); see also 17 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (requiring royalty payments for the importation
and distribution of digital audio recording devices and digital audio recording media).
108. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 111(d) (stating a cable system shall “deposit with the Register of
Copyrights, in accordance with requirements that the Register shall prescribe by regulation . . .
a statement of account . . .”); § 115(b)(1) (“Any person who wishes to obtain a compulsory
license under this section shall . . . serve notice of intention . . . . The notice shall comply, in
form, content, and manner of service, with requirements that the Register of Copyrights shall
prescribe by regulation.”); § 119 (“A satellite carrier . . . shall, on a semiannual basis, deposit
with the Register of Copyrights, in accordance with requirements that the Register shall
prescribe by regulation . . . a statement of account.”).
109. See Copyright Act of 1909 § 1(e), Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075, 1075–76
(repealed 1976); 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2012) (providing that “any other person, including those
who make phonorecords or digital phonorecord deliveries, may, by complying with the
provisions of this section, obtain a compulsory license to make and distribute phonorecords”
of musical works that have been previously distributed to the public).
110. See FISCAL 2016 REPORT, supra note 78, at 10.
111. See id. Royalties under other statutory licenses are administered by licensing
organizations like the Harry Fox Agency, for mechanical licenses, and SoundExchange, for
digital performance rights.
112. See 17 U.S.C. § 801.
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copyright law and economics. 113 However, the Office retains considerable
input on legal questions confronting the CRB. For any “novel material
question of substantive law” the CRB must “request a decision of the Register
of Copyrights, in writing.”114 The CRB can also seek the Register’s input on
matters of statutory interpretation or other substantive legal questions.115 And
the Register has the power to review a CRB decision for legal error. 116
Nonetheless, this division of labor reflects, in part, the Office’s relative lack of
expertise—either contributory or interactional—in economic questions.
The Office exercises considerable administrative authority over these
statutory licenses. And its interpretations of their provisions, informed by its
longstanding day-to-day responsibility for them, have been recognized by
courts. In perhaps the most powerful example, the Eleventh Circuit accepted
the Office’s interpretation of the term “cable system” under the § 111
statutory license as excluding satellite providers,117 and it did so despite the fact
that the Office’s regulations conflicted with the court’s own holding in a prior
case.118 And the D.C. Circuit has noted that the “Copyright Office certainly
has greater expertise in [interpreting the terms of § 111] than do the federal
courts.”119
But even with respect to these statutory licenses, the Office’s expertise has
its limits. Although the bulk of the Office’s regulatory output relates to these
licenses, 120 it is important to distinguish between administrative and
substantive regulations. Some Office rules relate to record keeping and other
procedural considerations, while others define various categories of services

113. 17 U.S.C. § 802(a) (providing that one judge must be an expert in copyright law and
another in economics). Although the CRB can claim some degree of legal and economic
expertise, it is far from ideally situated to set royalty rates that allocate billions of dollars
annually among copyright holders and service providers. Aside from its three administrative
judges, the CRB has a total staff of three. See § 802(b). Although an extreme example,
entrusting the regulation of billion dollar industries to a skeleton crew of federal employees is
emblematic of the lack of administrative resources devoted to copyright law.
114. 17 U.S.C. § 802(f)(1)(B).
115. See 17 U.S.C. § 802(f)(1)(A)(ii).
116. See 17 U.S.C. § 802(f)(1)(D).
117. See 37 C.F.R. § 201.17(k) (2018).
118. See Satellite Broad. & Communs. Ass’n of Am. v. Oman, 17 F.3d 344, 348 (11th Cir.
1994); NBC v. Satellite Broad. Networks, Inc., 940 F.2d 1467, 1471 (11th Cir. 1991).
119. Cablevision Sys. Dev. Co. v. Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., Inc., 836 F.2d 599, 608
(D.C. Cir. 1988); see also Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. Aereokiller, LLC, 851 F.3d 1002, 1011 (9th
Cir. 2017) (describing the Office as “institutionally better equipped than [the Court is] to sift
through and to make sense of the vast and heterogeneous expanse that is the Act’s legislative
history”); Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X LLC, 150 F. Supp. 3d 1, 24 (D.D.C. 2015) (noting
the Office’s “unique expertise in this highly technical area of the law”).
120. Regulations relating to these statutory licenses account for 64% of Copyright Office
regulations. See Joseph P. Liu, supra note 76, at 634.
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subject to different royalty rates.121 Although the Office has a strong claim to
expertise with respect to the former, it is far from clear that either the Office
or the CRB have the expertise necessary to define and distinguish between
various classes of digital services that are neither identified nor defined in the
Copyright Act. That is properly the responsibility of Congress.
This discussion is not intended to be an exhaustive account of those areas
of copyright law in which the Office can make a strong claim of expertise.
Questions related to deposit, 122 renewal, 123 and publication 124 —among
others—also implicate longstanding duties that frequently require the Office’s
careful consideration. To generalize from these examples, the Office’s
expertise is clearest when it interprets statutory provisions or implements rules
related to those issues it confronts on a day-to-day basis, either because of its
general administrative duties or an explicit congressional mandate. In those
domains, the Office primarily leverages contributory expertise gained through
both formal training and repeat experience. But as the next Part will
demonstrate, the Office’s role has expanded well beyond its contributory
expertise and likely beyond its current interactional expertise.


121. Compare 37 C.F.R. pt. 360.3 (outlining the form and content of claims), with 37 C.F.R.
pt. 385 (defining rates for the use of musical works in making and distributing phonorecords
for more than a dozen types of services).
122. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.19 (defining “best edition” and “complete copy” for purposes of
deposit).
123. Courts have not always been receptive to the Office’s views on renewal, however.
See Bartok v. Boosey & Hawkes, Inc., 523 F.2d 941, 947 n.10 (2d Cir. 1975) (refusing to defer
to the Office on an issue of first impression); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Roger Miller Music, Inc.,
396 F.3d 762, 778 (6th Cir. 2005) (declining to follow the Office’s interpretation of renewal
provisions).
124. See Batjac Prods., Inc. v. GoodTimes Home Video Corp., 160 F.3d 1223, 1230,
1235–36 (9th Cir. 1998) (embracing the Office’s view that “publication of a motion picture
constitutes the publication of its soundtrack”).
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THE LIMITS OF THE OFFICE’S EXPERTISE

Copyright law has grown increasingly technical as the copyright
marketplace has grown increasingly technological. Driven in part by a desire
for a more flexible and responsive regulatory model, the Office has been
granted new rulemaking authority and has pursued new opportunities to
influence policy in the digital environment. But the Office does not possess
unique insight into every question confronting copyright law today. For
instance, the Office is not particularly well-positioned to offer expert
guidance—much less draft binding exemptions from liability—on questions at
the frontier of copyright’s distention into the everyday lives of digital
consumers. As software permeates the market for consumer goods, copyright
law increasingly collides with complex regulatory structures and policy debates
that remain largely unfamiliar to the Office.
This Part focuses on the DMCA rulemaking to demonstrate that the
expansion of the Office’s responsibilities over the past two decades has already
outstripped its current expertise. When it comes to questions like device
security, privacy, competition, and public safety, the Office has no
contributory expertise to speak of, and there is little reason to believe it has
developed much in the way of interactional expertise.
A.

THE DMCA RULEMAKING

Section 1201 of the DMCA prohibits the circumvention of technological
protection measures that control access to copyrighted works. 125 In other
words, it establishes liability—distinct from traditional copyright
infringement—for bypassing, removing, or disabling a technological lock that
restricts access to a copyrighted work. In response to concerns voiced by a
variety of interest groups and industries, Congress included a number of
narrowly tailored exemptions to § 1201. These include circumvention
undertaken by law enforcement 126 and nonprofit libraries, 127 as well as
circumvention necessary for encryption research,128 security testing,129 some
acts of reverse engineering, 130 and the protection of personally identifiable
information.131 With the exception of the broad law enforcement carveout,
these exceptions are exceedingly narrow.

125. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2012). It also prohibits trafficking in tools that enable
the circumvention of both access and copy control. See §§ 1201(a)(2), (b)(1).
126. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(e).
127. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(d).
128. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(g).
129. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(j).
130. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f).
131. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(i).
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Recognizing the likelihood that other exceptions may prove necessary,
Congress provided for a triennial rulemaking—either as a “fail-safe
mechanism”132 that would help the statute keep pace with a rapidly changing
marketplace or as a deflection from political accountability for a potentially
unpopular impingement on consumer rights. 133 The statute calls on the
Librarian of Congress, acting on the recommendation of the Register of
Copyrights, 134 to conduct a rulemaking in order to identify classes of
copyrighted works, the noninfringing uses of which are likely to be adversely
affected by the prohibition on circumvention in the succeeding three-year
period.135 In practice, the Office conducts the rulemaking through a notice and
comment process, building and evaluating the factual record, providing the
legal analysis, and ultimately determining which exemptions should be
granted. 136 The statute includes five factors to be considered in evaluating
exemption proposals:
(i) the availability for use of copyrighted works;
(ii) the availability for use of works for nonprofit archival, preservation,
and educational purposes;
(iii) the impact . . . on criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching,
scholarship, or research;
(iv) the effect of circumvention . . . on the market for or value of
copyrighted works; and
(v) such other factors as the Librarian considers appropriate.137

Beyond this basic framework, the statute leaves the procedural and
substantive contours of the rulemaking in the hands of the Librarian—and in
practice, the Register. In effect, when Congress enacted the DMCA, it gave
the Office a new job for which it was poorly prepared. The rulemaking, which
essentially asks the Office to draft new exceptions to § 1201, entails a range of

132. H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 36 (1998) (internal quotation omitted).
133. See Bill D. Herman & Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., Catch 1201: A Legislative History and Content
Analysis of the DMCA Exemption Proceedings, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 121, 127–28 (2006).
134. In only one instance has the Librarian of Congress declined to follow the Register’s
recommendation. In 2010, the Register opposed renewing an existing exemption proposed by
the American Federation for the Blind that permitted circumvention of ebook DRM to enable
the read-aloud function or screen readers, determining that proponents had not met their
evidentiary burden under a de novo review. The Librarian “considered but rejected the
Register’s recommendation” and exempted such acts of circumvention. 75 Fed. Reg. 43,838
(July 27, 2010).
135. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C).
136. The statute provides that the Office “shall consult with the Assistant Secretary for
Communications and Information of the Department of Commerce.” Id. As a result, the
National Telecommunications and Information Administration weighs in during the
rulemaking process.
137. Id.
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technology-specific factual questions, inquiries into the market impact of
certain behaviors by users, and determinations of noninfringing uses. Rather
than leveraging the Office’s expertise on matters at the heart of its day-to-day
responsibilities, the DMCA rulemaking foists on the Office a set of questions
it has no business answering.138 Nor does a triennial process—completed just
six times over two decades139—afford the Office any meaningful opportunity
to develop the expertise necessary to discharge its statutory duties.
The history of the triennial rulemaking reveals an Office struggling
mightily. The Office has applied a set of shifting and unpredictable standards
that have yielded inconsistent and sometimes surprising results. In the most
dramatic example, the Register’s refusal to renew a twice-granted exemption
permitting owners of mobile phones to remove digital locks that prevented
them from lawfully using their devices on competing carrier networks led to
over 100,000 signatures on a White House petition, 140 an Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) investigation, 141 a private agreement
among carriers to allow unlocking,142 and an act of Congress overturning the
Register’s decision. 143 Although that particular determination managed to
capture the public’s attention, Office rulemaking generally goes unnoticed.144

138. See Herman & Gandy, supra note 133, at 124 (“This is a significant deviation from
the previous role of Copyright Office rulings, which have historically considered only technical
matters, leaving interpretation of issues such as fair use to the courts.”).
139. As of this writing, the Office is in the midst of the seventh triennial rulemaking.
140. See Derek Khanna, Cellphone Unlocking Is the First Step Toward Post-SOPA Copyright
Reform, BOING BOING (Feb. 22, 2013), https://boingboing.net/2013/02/22/taking-on-realreform-in-a-pos.html [https://perma.cc/SS3F-KP99].
141. See Derek Khanna, FCC to Investigate Cellphone Unlocking, FORBES (Mar. 1, 2013),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/derekkhanna/2013/03/01/fcc-to-investigate-cellphoneunlocking/#1b3aec28137b [https://perma.cc/V56B-KLHX].
142. See Roger C. Sherman & Kris Monteith, Wireless Providers Fulfill Commitment to Let
Consumers Unlock Mobile Phones, FED. COMM. COMMISSION (Feb. 11, 2015), https://
www.fcc.gov/news-events/blog/2015/02/11/wireless-providers-fulfill-commitment-letconsumers-unlock-mobile-phones [https://perma.cc/HCK8-HR7Z].
143. See Unlocking Consumer Choice and Wireless Competition Act, Pub. L. No. 113–
144 (2014).
144. Short of political pressure, it remains unclear how—or whether—the outcome of a
§ 1201 rulemaking can be challenged. Since the Office follows formal notice-and-comment
procedures in response to an explicit delegation of authority, courts may apply Chevron
deference in evaluating the choice to grant or deny an exemption. In a recent case challenging
both the failure to grant certain exemptions and the narrow scope of others, plaintiff
researchers argued that the final rule was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA. See
Complaint, Green v. Dep’t of Justice, No. 1:16-cv-01492 (D.D.C. July 21, 2016). In response,
the Department of Justice maintained that since the final rule was issued by the Librarian of
Congress, sovereign immunity precluded any APA challenge. See Memorandum in Support of
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Green v. Dep’t of Justice, No. 1:16-cv-01492-EGS (D.D.C.
Sept. 29, 2016) (“[C]ourts including the D.C. Circuit have repeatedly held that the APA’s
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RULEMAKING PROCEDURES & STANDARDS

In implementing the DMCA rulemaking, the Office has made a number
of contested interpretive choices.145 First, the directive to identify “classes of
works,” as opposed to classes of users or types of use, that should be exempt
from the anticircumvention provision was initially interpreted quite literally by
the Office. In the first two rulemakings, proposals were required to identify a
section 102 class of works—like sound recordings or audiovisual works.146
Those classes could be further narrowed by additional descriptive limitations
such as the media in which the works are fixed, their content, or the type of
protection measures applied to them.147 But the Register categorically rejected
proposals that limited the class of works by identifying groups of users or types
of use of works.148
In 2006, however, the Office dramatically altered its approach. Under its
new interpretation of the statute, 149 limiting a class by use or user was
permissible. Indeed, of the six exemptions the Office recommended, four
contained user- or use-based limitations.150 This shift with respect to one of

waiver of sovereign immunity in 5 U.S.C. § 702 does not apply to claims against the Library
of Congress, nor can the APA’s right of action in 5 U.S.C. § 706 be invoked against the Library
of Congress.”).
145. Although styled as a rulemaking, the Office’s approach is atypical. Rather than
conduct independent fact finding and propose potential exemptions, the Office—for reasons
almost certainly related to limited resources and expertise—relies on “proponents” to submit
exemptions proposals and build a factual record in support. “Opponents” are then given an
opportunity to submit objections. And both sides of this adversarial process are heard in
formal hearings before the Office. See Jonathan Band, The Complexity Dialectic: A Case Study
From
Copyright
Law
3
(Mar.
10,
2015)
(unpublished
manuscript),
http://infojustice.org/archives/34061 [https://perma.cc/EE3V-LUL7] (“[T]he Copyright
Office has converted the rulemaking into a quasi-adjudicatory proceeding, with burdens of
proof, rounds of submissions, and formal hearings.”).
146. The Commerce Committee Report on the DMCA explained that a class should be
“a narrow and focused subset of the broad categories of works of authorship . . . identified in
Section 102 of the Copyright Act.” H.R. REP., supra note 132, at 38.
147. See Memorandum from Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, to James H.
Billington, Librarian of Cong., Recommendation of the Register of Copyrights in RM 2002-4;
Rulemaking on Exemptions from Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection
Systems
for
Access
Control
Technologies
(Oct.
27,
2003),
https://www.copyright.gov/1201/docs/registers-recommendation.pdf [https://perma.cc/
36VN-E25F] [hereinafter 2003 Recommendation] (“[A]ttributes of the works themselves, and
not by reference to some external criteria such as the intended use or users of the works.”).
148. See Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems
for Access Control Technologies, 65 Fed. Reg. 64,556, 64,560 (Oct. 27, 2000); 2003
Recommendation, supra note 147, at 84–85.
149. See 2003 Recommendation, supra note 147, at 17–20.
150. The use- or user-based classes included audiovisual works used by film studies
professors for educational purposes, computer programs in obsolete formats used for archival
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the cornerstone principles of the rulemaking is largely responsible for the
uptick in granted exemptions, but at the same time, it has led to their increasing
narrowness.151
Once a class has been defined, the Office must determine whether the
anticircumvention provisions are likely to interfere with noninfringing uses of
works within that class. The question of infringement is typically the province
of federal courts, not the Office.152 The Office has little authority or experience
adjudicating infringement claims, so determining whether the uses envisioned
by exemption proposals are noninfringing presents a challenge: Infringement
is often a complex, fact intensive question, not a matter of simply interpreting
the statute. Indeed, the statute offers precious little guidance on the question,153
as evidenced by the competing approaches to infringement adopted among,
and sometimes within, the circuit courts. The uses at issue in the rulemaking
often involve new technologies and untested infringement theories,
exacerbating the challenge facing the Office.
Fair use complicates things even more. Initially the Office, cognizant of its
own limitations, approved exemptions only for uses that were unquestionably
noninfringing as a matter of well-settled law. 154 But such a conservative
approach threatened to render the rulemaking useless. Over time, the Office
grew bolder. In 2006, the Office recommended an exemption for audiovisual
works when circumvention is undertaken to enable educational use by
university professors on the uncontested assumption that such use was fair.155

purposes, wireless phone firmware used for to lawfully connect to a wireless network, and
sound recordings for the purposes of testing, investigating, or correcting security flaws. See
Memorandum from Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, to James H. Billington, Librarian
of Cong., Recommendation of the Register of Copyrights in RM 2005-11; Rulemaking on
Exemptions from Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access
Control Technologies 1–2 (Nov. 17, 2006), https://www.copyright.gov/1201/docs/
1201_recommendation.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U4PE-LZ74]
[hereinafter
2006
Recommendation].
151. In one instance, it led to the Register narrowing a previously-granted exemption. See
Christopher Moseng, The Failures and Possible Redemption of the DMCA Anticircumvention
Rulemaking Provision, 12 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 333, 350 (2007) (describing the narrowed
exemption for “certain computer programs and video games”); see also Mark Gray, New Rules
for a New Decade: Improving the Copyright Office’s Anti-Circumvention Rulemakings, 29 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 759, 792 (2014) (describing an exemption for DVDs as a “dense, four-paragraph
block of single-spaced text that took over two pages to spell out”).
152. Some have suggested that the primary function of the rulemaking is “reducing the
role of the courts—and of fair use—in the digital millennium.” Herman & Gandy, supra note
133, at 124.
153. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2012).
154. See 2003 Recommendation, supra note 147, at 155.
155. See 2006 Recommendation, supra note 150, at 1.
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In 2010,156 the Office went further, engaging in a full analysis of the four fair
use factors in connection with proposals to exempt jail-breaking mobile
phones and security testing on video games.157 These determinations were not
based on any directly-applicable judicial precedent, but the Office’s own
application of the fair use factors. 158 Regardless of whether it reached the
appropriate result, assuming the authority to make fair use determinations
signals a considerable expansion of the Office’s role. The Office continued to
analyze fair use in subsequent rulemakings, but has emphasized existing
precedent rather than its own judgment where possible.159
The Office’s struggle here is perhaps best understood as a function of
expertise. The Office has precious little experience deciding questions of
infringement or independently analyzing fair use. Although it lacks any
contributory expertise, the Office does, however, have a strong working
knowledge of the statute and case law, suggesting that it may be able to bring
interactional expertise to bear on these questions. The Office seems to
recognize that fair use determinations are at the outer edge of its expertise and

156. The third triennial rulemaking was significantly delayed; the Register made her
recommendations to the Librarian in June of 2010, some ten months after exemptions granted
in 2006 were set to expire.
157. Memorandum from Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, to James H. Billington,
Librarian of Cong., Recommendation of the Register of Copyrights in RM 2008-8; Rulemaking
on Exemptions from Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for
Access
Control
Technologies
92–100,
183–203
(June
11,
2010),
https://www.copyright.gov/1201/2010/initialed-registers-recommendation-june-112010.pdf [https://perma.cc/9YKC-AX4T] [hereinafter 2010 Recommendation].
158. Arielle Singh, Note, Agency Regulation in Copyright Law: Rulemaking Under the DMCA
and Its Broader Implications, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 527, 563 (2011) (“The Register showed
that she did not have to rely on judicial precedent or direct statutory language to determine if
a use was noninfringing.”).
159. In 2012, the Office determined that the creation of noncommercial videos,
documentary films, and multimedia ebook, and educational uses of audiovisual works were
“likely to be fair uses.” Memorandum from Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, to James
H. Billington, Librarian of Cong., Recommendation of the Register of Copyrights, Section
1201 Rulemaking: Fifth Triennial Proceeding to Determine Exemptions to the Prohibition on
Circumvention
126–27, (Oct. 12, 2012), https://www.copyright.gov/1201/2012/
Section_1201_Rulemaking_2012_Recommendation.pdf [https://perma.cc/EDR6-VB2C]
[hereinafter 2012 Recommendation]. And in 2015, the Office concluded space-shifting and
format-shifting of ebooks and audiovisual works were likely not fair. But that making e-books
accessible to blind, visually impaired, or print disabled persons, mobile phone unlocking,
modifying smart television firmware to enable interoperability were likely fair. See
Memorandum from Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, to James H. Billington, Librarian
of Cong., Recommendation of the Register of Copyrights, Section 1201 Rulemaking: Sixth
Triennial Proceeding to Determine Exemptions to the Prohibition on Circumvention 132
(Oct. 8, 2015), https://www.copyright.gov/1201/2015/registers-recommendation.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q92L-BEPB] [hereinafter 2015 Recommendation].
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has taken a reasonably cautious approach when confronted with such
arguments by carefully analogizing to existing judicial precedent.
Problematically, by creating a new venue for the resolution of fair use
questions growing out of technological protection measures, the rulemaking is
reducing the likelihood that courts will hear the current generation of fair use
cases, shifting power from the courts to the Office and impeding the
development of fair use to address new circumstances.160
One other change in the Office’s rulemaking standards is noteworthy. In
each subsequent rulemaking, the Office has reviewed existing exemptions de
novo, insisting on a new showing of ongoing harm. 161 This approach has
proven problematic for a number of reasons. Proposing an exemption and
building the factual record to support it is a massive undertaking. So de novo
review places a significant burden on the individuals and non-profit
organizations that submit the vast majority of exemption proposals.162 This
approach places a similar undue burden on the Office itself, which must deploy
resources to re-litigate issues even when no facts have changed.163 The de novo
review standard also ignores the ways in which the existence of an exemption
may reduce the availability of facts, demonstrating harm to noninfringing use
in subsequent periods.164
For the seventh triennial rulemaking, the Office announced a new process

160. Herman & Gandy, supra note 133, at 188; Elec. Frontier Found., DMCA Triennial
Rulemaking: Failing the Digital Consumer at 6 (Dec. 1, 2005), https://www.eff.org/document/
dmca-triennial-rulemaking-failing-digital-consumer
[https://perma.cc/4VFR-WWM4]
(“Rather than treating fair use as a forward-looking, evolving regime, the Copyright Office has
made it backward-looking, effectively barring courts from addressing the fair use implications
of new digital consumer technologies in the 21st century.”).
161. See generally 2003 Recommendation, supra note 147; 2006 Recommendation, supra
note 150; 2010 Recommendation, supra note 157; 2012 Recommendation, supra note 159; 2015
Recommendation, supra note 159.
162. Proponents of exemption proposals report dedicating over 500 hours of time to
build the legal and factual case for an exemption. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SECTION 1201
OF TITLE 17: A REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS 128 (June 2017),
https://www.copyright.gov/policy/1201/section-1201-full-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M2QD-THC7] [hereinafter SECTION 1201 REPORT]; see also Band, supra
note 145, at 5 (“The triennial rulemaking has evolved into a complex undertaking that is
difficult, if not impossible, for individuals or entities to navigate successfully without retaining
counsel.”).
163. See Moseng, supra note 151, at 353 (noting that the existing exemption for website
blacklists was denied in 2006 “not because of affirmative changes in the marketplace . . . but
because the party seeking the exemption chose to rest on the record from three years ago, and
argued that nothing had changed”) (internal quotation omitted).
164. See generally Aaron Perzanowski, Evolving Standards & the Future of DMCA
Anticircumvention Rulemaking, 10 J. INTERNET L. 1 (2007) (noting problems posed by the de
novo standard).
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for considering exemption renewals.165 Under this streamlined process,
a party must provide a short paragraph explaining the basis for its
request to readopt the exemption and declare that: if the exemption
is not renewed, users would be unable to make noninfringing uses
of the copyrighted works, and are likely to rely upon the exemption
in the next three-year period; and there has been no material change
in the facts . . . .166

In the absence of “meaningful opposition,” the Office will recommend the
exemption “on existing evidence.”167 For the reasons outlined above, this is an
important and positive reform to the rulemaking process. The optimistic could
interpret it as a sign that the Office is making slow incremental improvements
in the rulemaking. But it also shows that twenty years into the triennial
rulemaking, the Office continues to shift the goalposts. However, these
shifting standards do not represent the strongest critique of the Office’s role
in the triennial rulemaking.
C.

RULEMAKING SUBJECT MATTER & EXPERTISE

With each round, the subject matter of the proposed exemptions has
moved farther afield from the Office’s expertise. 168 Exemption proposals
commonly raise contested questions of fact and law regarding software and a
host of other new technologies. These questions entail matters of law and
policy far beyond copyright law—from election security and consumer privacy
to environmental protection and patients’ rights. The Office—designed to
create and track records of copyright claims—cannot be expected to resolve
those matters through the application of genuine expertise absent a ground-up
rethinking of its size, structure, and mission.
Since 2006, the Office has been repeatedly required to tackle matters that
it was never designed to and should have never been tasked with addressing.
The questions—orthogonal to the Office’s expertise, but central to the
rulemaking—arise in three distinct contexts. First, to determine whether
exemption proposals identify significant harms, the Office considers impacts
of protection measures that extend well beyond mere access to copyrighted
works. Second, to the extent the Office considers fair use, as it increasingly
has, as the basis for a finding of non-infringement, the nature and character of

165. See generally Rulemaking Proceedings Under Section 1201 of Title 17, U.S. COPYRIGHT
OFFICE, https://www.copyright.gov/1201/ [https://perma.cc/55KQ-XPG7].
166. See Transcript of Informational Video on Rulemaking, U.S. Copyright Office,
Streamlined Petitions for Renewed Exemptions (2018), https://www.copyright.gov/1201/
1201_streamlined_renewal_transcript.pdf [https://perma.cc/GVT9-HVS2].
167. Id.
168. See Ohm & Reid, supra note 9, at 1683–86.
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the use compels the Office to consider the broader social value of acts, like
security testing and medical diagnostics, enabled by circumvention. And third,
the fifth catch-all factor, under which the Office considers “such other factors
as the Librarian considers appropriate,” has been used by the Office to import
considerations well outside the scope of copyright law, including wireless
competition and vehicle safety.169
1.

Security Testing

Beginning in 2006, the Office has recommended a series of exemptions
related to security testing that illustrate well the degree to which the § 1201
rulemaking tests the limits of the Office’s expertise. The first such exemption
was prompted by Sony BMG’s distribution of music CDs that surreptitiously
installed protection measures cloaked by a rootkit that caused serious security
vulnerabilities for millions of consumers.170 In order to clarify the legality of
research to uncover and address security flaws in Digital Rights Management
(DRM) technologies, two academic researchers sought an exemption.171
As the Office noted at the time, “[i]t is difficult to fit concerns about
computer security into a rulemaking process which is focused on
noninfringing uses of copyrighted works.”172 Factually, the proposal required
the Office to engage deeply with the operation of these protection measures,
the risks they create for users, and the research methods used to assess them.
Moreover, it forced the Office to consider implications of the
anticircumvention rule well beyond the availability and market value of
copyrighted works. The Office was obliged to take into account “the strong
public interest in preventing the distribution of software that poses security
risks to the computers of unwitting consumers.”173
In 2010, the Office approved a similar exemption—this time applied to
video games that pose potential security risks. In assessing the risk of harm,
the Office was asked to consider the proponent’s claim that the security risks
at issue were “much more dangerous than the Sony rootkit flaw” and
opponents’ contention that “the vulnerability . . . was resolved and a patch
made available to consumers.” 174 Even a charitable interpretation of the
Office’s expertise must admit that it is poorly positioned to determine whether

169. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C)(v) (2012).
170. See generally Deirdre K. Mulligan & Aaron K. Perzanowski, The Magnificence of the
Disaster: Reconstructing the Sony BMG Rootkit Incident, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157, 1158 (2007).
171. In the interest of disclosure, as a law student under the supervision of Deirdre
Mulligan, I represented Ed Felten and Alex Halderman in the rulemaking, drafted their
exemption proposal, and testified in support of it.
172. 2006 Recommendation, supra note 150, at 60.
173. Id.
174. 2010 Recommendation, supra note 157, at 180–81 (internal quotation omitted).
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security risks are best addressed through independent research or marketfocused self-discipline.
By 2015, similar security concerns had spread to a range of products
including voting machines, medical devices, cars and other land vehicles, and
consumer devices generally.175 Perhaps more than any others, these proposals
exemplify the problem the Office now faces in § 1201 rulemaking. Exemption
opponents argue that “the risk to public safety that would be created by
granting [it] outweighs the minimal benefits offered by unauthorized security
research.”176 How an Office designed to register copyright claims is meant to
answer that question with anything approaching expertise remains a mystery.177
Not only must the Office evaluate a factual record that ranges from
hacking voice messaging systems in children’s toys, automobile remote locks,
vote tallies, and pacemakers, but it must also take the maze of regulations and
guidance issued by other federal agencies into account.178 In 2015, the Office
informed the Department of Transportation (DOT), the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) of
the rulemaking. 179 Each of those agencies cautioned against the proposed
exemption. “FDA expressed concerns about the proposed exemptions . . . for
medical device software security research”; “EPA urged the Office to decline
to recommend the proposed exemption . . . for vehicle software security
research [because it might] slow or reverse gains under the Clean Air Act”; and
“DOT noted concerns over the nature and timing of the potential public
disclosure of security research.”180
As DOT’s position suggests, one of the key questions the Office wrestled
with was “the extent to which any exemption should incorporate a
requirement that flaws uncovered by security researchers be disclosed to the
software developer and/or product manufacturer before being communicated

175. See 2015 Recommendation, supra note 159, at 7.
176. Id. at 292.
177. In a letter to the Office, the NTIA recognized the difficulty. Noting the “extensive
discussion of matters with no or at best a very tenuous nexus to copyright protection,” NTIA
urged the Office to avoid “interpreting the statute in a way that would require it to develop
expertise in every area of policy that participants may cite on the record.” Letter from
Lawrence E. Strickling, Assistant Sec’y. for Commc’ns & Info. & Adm’r of Nat’l Telecomm.
& Info. Admin., to Maria A. Pallante, Register of Copyrights 3–4 (Sept. 18, 2015),
https://copyright.gov/1201/2015/2015_NTIA_Letter.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3YVLKV3G].
178. See id.
179. See
USCO
Letters
to
Other
Agencies,
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF.,
https://www.copyright.gov/1201/2015/USCO-letters/
[https://perma.cc/Q692-UU6Y]
(last visited Nov. 20, 2018).
180. 2015 Recommendation, supra note 159, at 313–14.
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to the public at large.” 181 This is, simply put, a question the Office is not
qualified to answer. The Office summed up the problem it faces well:
The rules that should govern such research hardly seem the province
of copyright, since the considerations of how safely to encourage
such investigation are fairly far afield from copyright’s core purpose
of promoting the creation and dissemination of creative works.
Rather, the rules that should govern are best considered by those
responsible for our national security and for regulating the consumer
products and services at issue. That said, it is inescapable that the
anticircumvention prohibition in section 1201(a)(1) plays a role in
the debate.182

2.

Unlocking

In 2006, the Office recommended an exemption for circumvention of
protection measures on wireless telephone firmware to enable users to connect
to a mobile network, a process commonly referred to as unlocking. As the
Office correctly explained, these protection measures are “used by wireless
carriers to limit the ability of subscribers to switch to other carriers, a business
decision that has nothing whatsoever to do with the interests protected by
copyright.” 183 As a result, they implicate questions of competition in the
wireless market, typically the province of the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC).184
The Office effectively renewed that exemption in 2010, but noted that “the
issues discussed herein are particularly complicated because of the mobile
phone technologies at issue and the business models used in the wireless
industry,” a set of questions understandably outside the Office’s expertise.185
The Office was called on by proponents of the exemption to consider a
number of additional factors including: competition; small business
development; communications law; environmental concerns; and existing
subsidy arrangements.186 As the Office noted, these “may be valid arguments
to make before other administrative agencies, such as the FCC, but are inapt
here, in a proceeding conducted by the Copyright Office and the Librarian of
Congress, which have no responsibilities for, and no particular expertise in,
such matters . . . .”187 What the Office failed to recognize, however, is that
there is no avoiding these questions for an agency tasked with ongoing




181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id. at 275.
Id. at 316.
2006 Recommendation, supra note 150, at 52.
See 47 U.S.C. § 332 (2012).
2010 Recommendation, supra note 157, at 107.
See generally id.
Id. at 153.
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stewardship of § 1201 exemptions.188
In what was perhaps an effort to retreat from this unfamiliar territory, the
Office in 2012 all but eliminated the unlocking exemption, recommending a
provision limiting the exemption to phones “acquired within ninety days of its
effective date.”189 Although the Office continued to assert that at least some
unlocking was non-infringing, “the Register conclude[d] that . . . there are
ample alternatives to circumvention—that is, the marketplace has evolved
such that there is now a wide array of unlocked phone options available to
consumers.”190
The backlash to the new rule was swift and severe. Over 100,000 people
signed a White House petition to overrule the Office. 191 After FCC
commissioners spoke out against the decision, 192 the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) successfully
petitioned the FCC to take on the issue. 193 Shortly thereafter, the industry
announced a set of voluntary principles to facilitate unlocking. Moreover,
Congress passed legislation to revert to the broader 2010 exemption.194 After
this rebuke, the Office expanded the unlocking exemption in 2015 to include
not only mobile phones but also, tablets, portable connectivity devices like
hotspots, and wearable devices like smartwatches.195

188. As the NTIA has noted “non-copyright concerns have been relevant to proposed
exemptions in past rulemakings, highlighting in particular the competition and
telecommunications policies supporting past cellphone unlocking exemptions.” 2015
Recommendation, supra note 159, at 245.
189. 2012 Recommendation, supra note 159, at 100.
190. Id. at 95.
191. The Obama administration expressed its disagreement with the decision, but
appeared unwilling or unable to directly challenge it. Edward Wyatt, F.C.C. Backs Consumers in
Unlocking of Cellphones, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/
03/05/technology/fcc-urges-a-right-to-unlock-cellphones.html
[https://perma.cc/2KJARXDQ] (“Because the Library of Congress, and therefore the copyright office, are part of the
legislative branch, the White House cannot simply overturn the current ruling.”).
192.
I think that is one powerful librarian. I also think this new approach does
not make sense. Because if you have a mobile device, want to unlock it, and
you are not bound by a service contract—you should be able to use it on
another network. That makes our markets for wireless service more
competitive—and that benefits consumers.
Jessica Rosenworcel, Comm’r, Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, Statement Re: Cell Phone Unlocking
Presentation (Dec. 12, 2013).
193. See Khanna, supra note 141.
194. See Unlocking Consumer Choice and Wireless Competition Act, Pub. L. No. 113144 (2014).
195. See 2015 Recommendation, supra note 159, at 6–7.
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Jailbreaking

Relatedly, the Office recommended an exemption in 2010 that permitted
circumvention of software on mobile phones for the purpose of enabling
interoperability with other programs. 196 This process, commonly known as
jailbreaking, allows users to install software that has not been approved by the
phone’s manufacturer of the developer of its operating system.197
In opposition to this proposal, Apple argued that its protection measures
were necessary to avoid a host of calamities that included: “crashes and
instability;” “malfunctioning and safety;” “invasion of privacy;” “exposing
children to age-inappropriate content;” “viruses and malware;” and “the
inability to update software.”198 As a result, Apple argued that an exemption
would reduce the value of its software. While the Office ultimately rejected
those arguments, the challenges demonstrate the degree to which the
rulemaking calls on the Office to consider questions far beyond its expertise.
In 2012, the Office followed a similar analysis and recommended a similar
exemption. 199 And in 2015, it expanded the exemption to include
“smartphones and portable all-purpose mobile computing devices . . . .”200
It also recommended the adoption of a new, but related exemption for
smart televisions. 201 There, LG raised similar arguments that an exemption
“would harm ‘platform security’ by making smart TVs more vulnerable to
malicious software or hacking.” 202 Ultimately, the Office found that claim
unpersuasive, but that determination—right or wrong—is not rooted in the
unique perspective of an expert agency.
4.

Additional 2015 Exemptions

The Office recommended three additional exemptions in 2015 that
illustrate the expanding scope of the technologies under consideration in the
rulemaking and underscore how far the Office has been required to stray from
its core responsibilities.
First, the Office endorsed an exemption for circumventing protection
measures applied to computer programs that control the functioning of
motorized land vehicles, excluding their telematics or entertainment systems.203
Access to that software is often necessary to diagnose problems, perform




196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

See 2010 Recommendation, supra note 157, at 100.
Id.
Id. at 80.
See generally 2012 Recommendation, supra note 159.
2015 Recommendation, supra note 159, at 192.
See id. at 217.
Id. at 209.
See id. at 246.
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routine maintenance, install replacement parts, repair malfunctions, and
modify a vehicle.204 But manufacturers from General Motors to John Deere
have restricted access to the code that operates these vehicles.205 As a result,
“vehicle owners must take their cars to authorized repair shops, or purchase
expensive manufacturer-authorized tools, to diagnose and repair their
vehicles.”206 Such tactics could reduce competition in the market for repair
services and replacement parts, undermine safety, and reduce the resale value
of vehicles.207 Though deeply troubling, it’s worth remembering that none of
these harms bear any plausible connection to copyright law.
Opponents of the exemption raised concerns related to public safety,
security, and the environment. They claimed the exemption could reduce
vehicle fuel efficiency, increase emissions, 208 and threaten cybersecurity.
Perhaps most astoundingly, they argued an exemption “would make it easier
for violent partners and predators to monitor, stalk, and harm victims through
access to what is now protected internal automobile systems and
technology.” 209 And again, both DOT and EPA weighed in against the
exemption. While the Office took these concerns into account, finding that
“the fifth statutory factor . . . weigh[s] against an exemption,” it ultimately
recommended it. 210 Even for those who agree that the exemption was
warranted, the mismatch between the Office’s expertise and the considerations
it was forced to weigh is striking.
Second, the Office recommended an exemption that would permit
circumvention necessary for operators of 3D printers to use the material, or
feedstock, of their choice.211 In much the same way that Lexmark and other
printer makers have attempted to control toner cartridges, 3D printer
manufacturers have attempted to leverage their power over durable goods to

204. AARON PERZANOWSKI & JASON SCHULTZ, THE END OF OWNERSHIP: PERSONAL
PROPERTY IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 146–47 (Laura DeNardis & Michael Zimmer eds.,
2016).
205. See 2015 Recommendation, supra note 159, at 228.
206. Id. at 224.
207. Some farmers have been forced to download firmware for their equipment from
Ukrainian websites due to the restrictions imposed by John Deere. See Jason Koebler, Why
American Farmers Are Hacking Their Tractors with Ukrainian Firmware, MOTHERBOARD (Mar. 21,
2017),
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/xykkkd/why-american-farmers-arehacking-their-tractors-with-ukrainian-firmware [https://perma.cc/GV4X-NRNJ].
208. Ironically, the anticircumvention provision itself contributed to Volkswagen’s ability
to hide its efforts to cheat emissions testing protocols for its diesel vehicles. See PERZANOWSKI
& SCHULTZ, supra note 204.
209. 2015 Recommendation, supra note 159, at 233.
210. Id. at 244.
211. See id. at 356.
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control the market for consumables.212
Proponents of the exemption argued that it would “strengthen property
rights, encourage competition and innovation, and meet consumer
expectations concerning ownership of consumer devices.” 213 Although the
Office signaled its agreement, the FDA expressed concern that the exemption
could “create unintended public health and safety risks in relation to medical
devices produced using 3D printers.” 214 The Office acknowledged that
although those concerns were “not copyright-related,” they were “sufficiently
weighty to merit consideration in drafting an exemption.”215 As a result, the
Office included the proviso that “the exemption shall not extend to . . . goods
or materials for use in commerce the physical production of which is subject
to legal or regulatory oversight . . . .”216
Finally, the Office recommended an exemption permitting circumvention
to enable access to “data generated by implanted medical devices.” 217
Pacemakers, defibrillators, insulin pumps, and other implanted devices record
and communicate medical data to hospitals and doctors’ offices. Because of
encryption and other protection measures, patients are often unable to easily
and quickly access data about their own bodies.218
Device makers and the FDA, which offered recent guidance
recommending such protection measures, expressed misgivings related to
device security and patient privacy.219 Although proponents of the exemption
argued that “the Librarian and the Office are ill equipped[sic] to make
determinations about privacy and patient safety,” the Office determined that
the “serious nature of these concerns means that they must be carefully
considered . . . .”220 In the end, the Office was convinced that the case in favor
of the exemption outweighed the concerns of the FDA.221
In addition to renewals of existing exemptions, the 2018 rulemaking has
generated new or expanded proposals for exemptions related to jailbreaking,
unlocking, device repair, security research, 3D printing, and avionics.222 For

212. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 545 (6th
Cir. 2004); Impression Prod., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1530 (2017).
213. 2015 Recommendation, supra note 159, at 362.
214. Id. at 375.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 377.
217. Id. at 7.
218. PERZANOWSKI & SCHULTZ, supra note 204 at 152–53.
219. See 2015 Recommendation, supra note 159, at 22–23.
220. Id. at 388, 399.
221. See id. at 399
222. Section 1201 Exemptions to Prohibition Against Circumvention of Technological Measures
Protecting Copyrighted Works: Petitions for Newly Proposed Exemptions, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF.,
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the foreseeable future, the Office will face the unenviable but statutorilyrequired task of resolving a set of questions it should never have been asked
in the first place. Even when the Office reaches the right result, one should
remain mindful of the strain on and the distraction to the Office the
rulemaking represents.
In many respects, the Office deserves considerable credit for its handling
of the rulemaking process, not because of its deep expertise but because of its
absence. With a congressional mandate that stacks the odds against it, the
Office has muddled through the immense triennial undertaking and, with a
few notable exceptions aside, has managed to reach an appropriate or at least
defensible result more often than not. However, whether any one
commentator agrees with these outcomes is quite distinct from the question
of the Office’s expertise and the wisdom of entrusting this process to its
ambivalent care. Indeed, regardless of what decisions the Office ultimately
makes with respect to these exemption proposals, the record makes clear that
the Office is all but guaranteed to face matters beyond any reasonable
definition of its expertise.
These concerns over the mismatch between the Office’s expertise and the
technological and policy questions presented by the spread of software extend
beyond the § 1201 rulemaking. In 2015, for example, Senators Grassley and
Leahy—noting that “copyrighted software is . . . now essential to the operation
of our refrigerators, our cars, our farm equipment, our wireless phones, and
virtually any other device you can think of”—asked the Office to provide
guidance on software’s “ever-increasing role in defining consumer interactions
with devices and products . . . .” 223 In response, the Office conducted a
study—soliciting comments, holding roundtables—and ultimately issued its
analysis of a range of issues that included the resale of software-enabled
consumer products, their repair and modification, security, interoperability,
and competition.224 While many of these issues implicate copyright doctrine,
the Office is no better positioned to address their practical, technological, and
economic complexities in a report to Congress than it is in the context of a

https://www.copyright.gov/1201/2018/petitions-091317 [https://perma.cc/TW23-LSUP]
(last visited Nov. 20, 2018).
223. See Letter from Charles Grassley, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, & Patrick
Leahy, Ranking Member, Comm. on the Judiciary, to Maria Pallante, Register of Copyrights
(Oct. 22, 2015), https://www.grassley.senate.gov/sites/default/files/judiciary/upload/201510-22%20GEG-Leahy%20to%20Copyright%20Office%20%28Software%20Copyright%
20Study%20Request%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/2PBW-ENGZ].
224. See CONSUMER PRODUCTS REPORT, supra note 7, at 27–60. The Office’s 69-page
report ultimately concluded that “faithful application of existing copyright law doctrines
should provide no barrier to legitimate uses.” Id. at ii.
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rulemaking. 225 Despite the poor fit between the modern copyright
environment and the expertise of the Office, questions of this sort will only
grow more common and more pressing in years to come. So it is important to
consider what, if anything, the Office can do to build the sort of expertise these
obligations demand.
V.

AN EXPERT COPYRIGHT OFFICE

The current mismatch between the Office’s expertise and its duties risks
distracting the Office from its core responsibilities. Moreover, it undermines
the Office’s determinations in the DMCA rulemaking and other regulatory
efforts, and it threatens to skew the input Congress receives as part of the
legislative process. As an initial matter, both Congress and the Office should
approach any new delegations of authority with caution, and they should
consider ways to better align the Office’s existing authority with its expertise.
Moving forward, if the Office is expected to function as an expert agency,
Congress should direct and fund the creation of new centers of expertise
within it. Finally, as copyright continues to encroach on the everyday lives of
citizens, the Office should establish an internal consumer advocate to ensure
the public interest is taken into account.
A.

REFOCUSING THE OFFICE’S AGENDA

In light of the foregoing discussion, proposals to shift additional authority
from the courts and Congress to the Office should be met with skepticism.
Recent years have seen suggestions for the Office to adjudicate small claims,226
resolve fair use disputes,227 and craft exemptions to traditional infringement
liability. 228 But the Office is poorly positioned to take on these additional

225. More generally, Congress sometimes asks the Office to study important questions of
copyright law and policy. See, e.g., U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, FEDERAL COPYRIGHT
PROTECTION FOR PRE-1972 SOUND RECORDINGS: A REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF
COPYRIGHTS (2011); U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DMCA SECTION 104 REPORT: A REPORT OF
THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS PURSUANT TO § 104 OF THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM
COPYRIGHT ACT (2001). The input Congress receives from the Office would be more useful
and reliable if informed by greater technical and economic expertise. As for the courts, they
should continue to follow the Office’s guidance only to the extent they find it persuasive.
226. See generally H.R. 5757, 114th Cong. (2d Sess. 2016).
227. See Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087, 1127–28 (2007)
(proposing the creation of a Fair Use Board within the Office, but noting that “deference to
the agency’s expertise would be inappropriate in these circumstances” and “the power to make
generally binding interpretations of the law would remain with the federal courts”).
228. See Liu, supra note 74, at 152 (“Congress could delegate to the Copyright Office the
authority to promulgate additional exemptions via regulation.”). See also Terry Hart, Copyright
Reform Step Zero, 19 INFO. & COMM. TECH. L. 147, 152 (2010) (suggesting that “detailed
provisions and exceptions which currently pad Title 17 would be shifted to the C.F.R., where
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obligations. 229 It lacks the necessary expertise and resources. Although it
continues to make progresses, the Office is struggling to hoist its registration
and recordation systems into the twenty-first century.
Rather than expanding the Office’s portfolio, Congress should consider
scaling back its duties. The DMCA rulemaking is an obvious place to start.
Short of repealing § 1201 altogether—an option that has considerable merit
beyond lessening the burdens facing the Office230—there are a number of steps
worth considering. Informed in part by the Office’s prior rulemaking efforts,
Congress should significantly expand the existing statutory exemptions for
reverse engineering, security testing, and encryption research. 231 Moreover,
Congress should consider crafting new permanent statutory exemptions.
Those might address specific concerns, like repair and unlocking, that have
emerged since the DMCA’s enactment.232 Or more broadly, Congress could
exempt circumvention that lacks any nexus with infringement 233 or
circumvention undertaken by the owner of a device or copy.234 After twenty
years, the unintended consequences of § 1201 have become abundantly clear
to anyone paying attention.235 Rather than force the Office to plug new holes
in the dike every three years, Congress should take responsibility for the over
breadth of the anticircumvention rules.
In the absence of congressional intervention, the Office could relieve some
of its own burden by granting broader temporary exemptions, subject to a
presumption of renewal, rather than the narrowly-defined, parsimonious
exemptions it has granted in recent rulemakings. 236 Another approach that
would at least partially extricate the Office from the burden of resolving
questions beyond its expertise is to determine that certain activities simply do

they could be more effectively administered and reformed as needed”).
229. Liu, supra note 74, at 157 (“The Copyright Office currently does not have sufficient
resources or expertise to take on a substantially more robust policymaking role.”).
230. See PERZANOWSKI & SCHULTZ, supra note 204.
231. The Office itself has recommended that Congress broaden existing statutory
exemptions and create some new ones, a solution that would lessen, though not eliminate, the
burden the Office faces in the rulemaking. See SECTION 1201 REPORT, supra note 162, at 62–
63.
232. Id. at 88–99.
233. See generally Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (holding that a claim for circumvention requires a “critical nexus” to copyright
infringement).
234. See PERZANOWSKI & SCHULTZ, supra note 204, at 177 (recommending an exemption
for copy and device owners).
235. See generally ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: SIXTEEN
YEARS UNDER THE DMCA (2014); Jacqueline Lipton, The Law of Unintended Consequences: The
Digital Millennium Copyright Act and Interoperability, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 487 (2005).
236. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
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not violate the anticircumvention provision in the first place. If consumers and
researchers face a cloud of uncertain liability, the Office could provide some
reassurance and clarity that security research or device unlocking, for example,
do not violate § 1201. So far, the Office has been reluctant to adopt that
approach, opting to craft narrow temporary exemptions out of an abundance
of caution.237 But the power to determine whether or not an activity presents
a prima facie case of circumvention is implicit in the Office’s rulemaking
authority. 238 When exemptions are necessary, the Office would do well to
confine its analysis to those facts directly relevant to questions of
circumvention and infringement. The DOT or FDA may have their own views
on the advisability of technological controls, but those views are almost
certainly based on non-copyright rationales. Taking those views into account
will almost inevitably require the Office to exceed its expertise.
B.

BUILDING EXPERTISE

Although an Office more focused on its core responsibilities is likely the
best short-term solution, the Office can and should develop new expertise
given the changes copyright law has undergone and will continue to confront.
Even if the Office significantly narrows the factual scope of the § 1201
rulemaking, its other administrative and policy responsibilities would benefit
from greater expertise. As others have suggested, the Office would do well to
establish internal sources of contributory expertise with respect to both
economics and technology.239 While individual members of the Office staff
and leadership may bring relevant experience to bear, those fortuitous
personnel choices are no substitute for a long-term institutional commitment
to economic and technological expertise.240
To build these capacities, the Office should name a “Chief Economist”
and “Chief Technologist.” 241 Other federal agencies that confront similarly
complex legal and policy matters have recognized the need for highly qualified
experts to inform their decision making. The Federal Trade Commission

237. See generally 2006 Recommendation, supra note 150; 2010 Recommendation, supra
note 157; 2012 Recommendation, supra note 159.
238. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (2012).
239. Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Principles Project: Directions for Reform, 25 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1175, 1205 (2010); Liu, supra note 74, at 157 (noting that “the Office would benefit
from greater technological expertise” and that “increased economic expertise would be vital”).
240. Former Copyright Office General Counsel Sarang Damle, for example, had a
background in software development, which no doubt helped inform the Office’s
understanding of some software-related questions. See Abioye Ella Mosheim, An Interview with
Sy Damle: General Counsel and Associate Register of the US Copyright Office, 10 LANDSLIDE (2017)
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/landslide/2017-nov-dec/
interview-sy-damle.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/466J-7NG6].
241. Samuelson, supra note 239, at 1205.
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(FTC), for example, named Ed Felten its first Chief Technologist in 2011.242
Since then a series of distinguished technologists has served in that role.243 The
FTC’s Bureau of Economics also houses a sizable team of experts. 244 The
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) named Stu Graham as
its first Chief Economist in 2010, 245 and today that office houses four
economic experts. 246 The FCC has employed a Chief Economist since the
1940s,247 and it recently voted to establish an Office of Economics & Analytics
to concentrate its economics and data operations. 248 The Commission also
relies on a Chief Technology Officer, who advises the “the Chairman on
technology and engineering issues, together with the Office of Engineering
and Technology.”249
Establishing similar centers of expertise within the Office could prove
beneficial in a number of ways. Deep technical expertise would not only help
the Office evaluate empirical claims in the record of its rulemakings and studies,
it would also better inform the Office as to what questions need to be asked
in the first place. When the Office recently created its Copyright

242. See FTC Chief Technologists, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/aboutftc/biographies/ftc-chief-technologist [https://perma.cc/527W-86MA] (last visited Nov. 21,
2018). Felten, who sought an exemption for his research in the 2006 DMCA rulemaking, was
later named Deputy U.S. Chief Technology Officer by President Obama. Megan Smith &
Alexander MacGillivray, The White House Names Dr. Ed Felten as Deputy U.S. Chief Technology
Officer, WHITE HOUSE PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA (May 11, 2015),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2015/05/11/white-house-names-dr-ed-feltendeputy-us-chief-technology-officer [https://perma.cc/9HGT-EMZB].
243. See FTC Chief Technologists, supra note 242 (listing Dr. Steve Bellovin, Dr. Latanya
Sweeney, Ashkan Soltani, Dr. Laurie Faith Cranor, and Neil Chilson as Dr. Felen’s successors).
244. See
Bureau
of
Economics
Biographies, FED. TRADE COMMISSION,
https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureaus-offices/bureau-economics/biographies
[https://perma.cc/WV64-6YF4].
245. See Press Release, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, USPTO Chief Economist
Unveils Agency’s New Economic Research Agenda During Conference on Intellectual
Property and the Innovation Economy (Dec. 9, 2010), https://www.uspto.gov/aboutus/news-updates/uspto-chief-economist-unveils-agencys-new-economic-research-agendaduring [https://perma.cc/GR76-SKYN].
U.S.
PATENT
AND
TRADEMARK
OFFICE,
246. Economic
Researchers,
https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/ip-policy/economic-research/economicresearchers [https://perma.cc/RV6P-K9KV] (last visited Nov. 21, 2018).
247. See Bill Melody, Dallas Smythe: A Lifetime at the Frontier of Communications, 17 CANADIAN
J. COMM. (1992), https://www.cjc-online.ca/index.php/journal/article/view/693/599
[https://perma.cc/24M5-FX4M] (noting that Smythe was the FCC’s first Chief Economist
and served from 1943 to 1948).
248. See Order, In re Establishment of the Office of Economics and Analytics, FCC 18-7
(MD Docket No. 18-3) (Jan. 31, 2018, FCC Rcd.).
249. Chief Technology Officer of the FCC, FED. COMM. COMMISSION,
https://www.fcc.gov/strategic-planning-policy-analysis/chief-technology-officer-fcc#blockmenu-block [https://perma.cc/73TZ-LNLS].
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Modernization Office and named its first Director of Copyright
Modernization, it acknowledged the need to bolster its technological expertise
when it comes to its IT infrastructure.250 The Office should apply a similar
degree of self-reflection to its policy and rulemaking functions. Likewise, given
the fundamentally economic justification for U.S. copyright law, the absence
of expert economic analysis within the Office is both puzzling and troubling.
The Office should not only have the capacity to meaningfully evaluate the
economic claims of the parties before it, but it should be capable of generating
independent and objective economic analysis to inform and support its
policymaking. If the Office wants to grow into an agency with authority on par
with the FCC or USPTO, it needs to develop a similar degree of expertise.
C.

A VOICE FOR THE PUBLIC

To the extent increased expertise enables the Office to expand its
substantive copyright policy agenda, it should consider a more formal and
intentional mechanism for taking the public interest into account in its decision
making. Procedurally, the Office has been careful in its rulemakings and policy
studies to include a range of voices and perspectives. But the Office influences
policy through non-public processes as well.
To take one recent example, the Office weighed in on the FCC’s “Unlock
the Box” initiative, a proposed rule that would have required cable providers
to open their platforms to third-party set-top boxes.251 That rule would have
enabled consumers to access licensed video content using the device of their
choice, ending abusive practices by cable companies that enjoy an effective
monopoly over set-top box hardware.252 In closed-door communications with
the FCC, as well as a letter to certain congressional Representatives, the Office
asserted that the rule would have encroached on copyright holders’ “exclusive
right to license” and their “right to manage the exploitation of a copyrighted
work.”253 Neither of those purported rights has any basis in copyright law.254
In fact, a viewer’s use of a third-party cable box rather than one provided by
the local cable franchise does not implicate any of the exclusive rights granted

250. See Press Release, U.S. Copyright Office, U.S. Copyright Office Announces New
Division: The Copyright Modernization Office (Mar. 30, 2018), https://
www.copyright.gov/newsnet/2018/711.html [https://perma.cc/J36D-LV9G].
251. See Tom Wheeler, Chairman, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Statement: FCC Proposes to
“Unlock the Box” (Feb. 18, 2016), https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-proposes-unlockbox/wheeler-statement [https://perma.cc/D4KN-UQF7].
252. See id.
253. Letter from Maria Pallante, Register of Copyrights, to Reps. Blackburn, Butterfield,
Collins, and Deutch 7 (Aug. 3, 2016).
254. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
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to copyright holders.255 Had the Office taken the public interest into account,
it may have offered a more sound analysis. Instead, its view was apparently
shaped by months of private phone calls and meetings with the Motion Picture
Association of America, Viacom, and Comcast.256
Even when the Office does hear from the public, structural biases tend to
favor the perspective of rights holders. In an interview with the American Bar
Association, former Register Pallante revealed her fundamental
misunderstanding of our copyright system and the Office’s role within it. As
she put it, “Copyright is for the author first and the nation second.”257 While
it would be a mistake to attribute this constitutionally flawed view to the Office
as a whole, it is suggestive of the Office’s long-recognized tendency to
prioritize the interests of copyright holders over those of the public.258
In some ways, this tendency is understandable. The Office regularly
interacts with copyright holders in its day-to-day operations, and rights holders
and their various trade associations and industry groups are regular, repeat
participants in every policy process the Office undertakes. Moreover, it is not
uncommon for Office personnel to represent those same interests before and
after their government service, reinforcing the ties between the Office and
industry. 259 More broadly, copyright policymaking faces familiar challenges
when it comes to fully accounting for the public interest. While rights holders
are a concentrated, organized, and sophisticated constituency, the public
interest is diffuse, largely unorganized, and poorly resourced. 260 Although
recent years have seen certain technology firms serve as an effective
counterbalance to the copyright industries, those firms are often, at best, an
imperfect proxy for the interests of consumers.
To account for its biases and better reflect the interests of consumers, the

255. See Letter from Copyright Professors to Marlene Dortch, Sec’y, Fed. Commc’ns
Comm’n (Sept. 22, 2016).
256. Ernesto Falcon, Newly-Released Documents Show Hollywood Influenced the Copyright Office’s
Comments on Set-Top Boxes, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 25, 2016),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/10/newly-released-documents-show-hollywoodinfluenced-copyright-offices-comments-set [https://perma.cc/T8H6-MWYJ].
257. Mike Masnick, How Can You Be Register Of Copyrights If You Don’t Even Understand
Copyright’s Most Basic Purpose?, TECHDIRT (April 5, 2012), https://www.tech
dirt.com/articles/20120330/09445718303/how-can-you-be-register-copyrights-if-you-donteven-understand-copyrights-most-basic-purpose.shtml [https://perma.cc/C4B3-WGFC].
258. JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 74 (2001) (“Unfortunately, the Copyright
Office has tended to view copyright owners as its real constituency.”); Liu, supra note 74, at
158 (“One common critique of the Copyright Office has been the extent to which it has largely
backed the interests of copyright holders over the interests of consumers more generally.”).
259. See ROSE, CLOUGH & PANJWANI, supra note 58, at 5–6.
260. See Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29, 33
(1994).
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Office should consider establishing a public advocate. State and federal
agencies ranging from the FDA, 261 public utilities commissions, 262 and
insurance regulators263 have recognized that the public interest requires not
only access to regulatory processes, but a concerted effort to level a playing
field that, for a variety of structural reasons, tends to favor industry. A
copyright public advocate would consider the impact of proposed regulations
and policy positions on consumers, proactively defending the public interest
as part of the Office’s internal deliberative process and counterbalancing the
persistent influence of industry. Such an advocate would not eliminate the
need for broad participation in rulemaking and policy studies, but could help
ensure that the Office gives due consideration to the impact of copyright law
on the public. Further, it would lend the Office additional credibility and
legitimacy.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The expertise of the Office has failed to keep pace with its expanded role
in our copyright system. When it comes to a number of pressing questions of
law and policy, the Office lacks the technological and economic expertise
necessary to justify congressional delegations of authority and judicial
deference. But the responsibility for that mismatch falls squarely on the
shoulders of Congress. Rather than bear the burden of taming the monster it
created in § 1201, Congress foisted that job on the Office. To address these
concerns, the Office should focus its efforts on its primary registration-related
responsibilities for the time being. But given its statutory duties and the chorus
calling for even greater responsibility—some of which come from within the
Office itself264—the Office should also begin to build out its expertise, and
Congress should provide it with the resources to do so.

261. See About the FDA Patient Representative Program, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/ForPatients/About/ucm412709.htm
[https://perma.cc/K7BCJYYK] (last visited Nov. 21, 2018).
262. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 309.5(a) (Deering 2018), (creating an “independent Office
of Ratepayer Advocates to represent and advocate on behalf of the interests of public utility
customers and subscribers”); see also OFFICE OF THE OHIO CONSUMERS’ COUNSEL,
http://www.occ.ohio.gov/message.shtml [https://perma.cc/VRQ3-RUEZ].
263. See, e.g., The Office of the Consumer Advocate Division, W. VA. OFFS. OF THE INS.
COMMISSIONER, http://www.wvinsurance.gov/Divisions/Consumer-Advocate [https://
perma.cc/7V25-VYNY] (“The Consumer Advocate is mandated to advocate for, and protect,
the interest of the West Virginia consumers.”).
264. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT SMALL CLAIMS: A REPORT OF THE
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS (2013), https://www.copyright.gov/docs/smallclaims/uscosmallcopyrightclaims.pdf [https://perma.cc/BJ7P-FVU7].


